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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of twentieth century southern sheriffs; specifically, 
their role in southern racial violence and the Civil Rights Movement. Despite the 
southern sheriffs central role in southern racial history, this local law enforcement 
officer has attracted surprisingly little historical attention. And despite historians’ 
extensive studies of lynchings and racial violence in the South, they have remained 
relatively quiet on the subject of sheriffs. This paper seeks to bring the southern sheriff to 
the forefront of southern racial history, for they provide a unique window into the South’s 
history of segregation, racism, and mob violence.
Part I examines the southern sheriffs central role in southern racial history from 
Reconstruction to the early twentieth century. Some were members of the Ku Klux Klan, 
participating in the lynching of African Americans, or at the very least, doing little to 
hinder white mob violence. Many members of their white communities often expected 
them to “capably” enforce the social order and racial caste, while blocking racial progress 
or equality. Without the complicity of their local sheriff, these lynchings might not have 
occurred. In such cases, sheriffs played a central role in mob violence even if  they did not 
participate directly in the lynching itself.
Part II explores the activists who noted the central role of southern sheriffs in 
racial violence and attempted to expose and challenge southern sheriffs’ power. In the 
late nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth, individuals like Ida B. 
Wells and Arthur Raper, and organizations such as the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Southern Commission on Lynching, and 
the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching (ASWPL), penned 
their observations in pamphlets, bulletins, and flyers in order to increase public awareness 
of the South’s law enforcement problem.
Part III focuses on James G. Clark of Selma, Alabama, and Lawrence Rainey of 
Philadelphia, Mississippi, two sheriffs of the Deep South whose violent attempts to 
thwart African Americans’ pursuit of voting rights and desegregation attracted national 
attention during the Civil Rights Movement. Valuable historical accounts of the 
Movement have focused on important leaders, major national organizations, and 
significant events, but have never focused on sheriffs like Clark and Rainey, whose 
extremist viewpoints and actions had a direct effect on the Movement’s goals and on how 
events such as the Selma march unfolded.
This paper concludes that the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had an 
immediate impact on the election of the local sheriff and the demographics of the 
sheriffs office. Although the Voting Rights Act alone could not eradicate racism within 
the southern sheriffs office, the bill dismantled the legal restraints that prevented black 
southerners from voting, and allowed them to influence the choice of sheriff.
“CARETAKERS OF THE COLOR LINE”: 
SOUTHERN SHERIFFS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
2INTRODUCTION
“Sheriff John Brown always hated me 
For what I don’t know 
Ev’ry time I plant a seed 
He said, ‘Kill it before it grows.’
He said, ‘Kill them before they grow.’
Freedom came my way one day 
And I started out of town,
All of a sudden I saw Sheriff John Brown 
Aiming to shoot me down 
So I shot, I shot, I shot him down 
And I say, if I’m guilty I will pay.”
Lyrics from Bob Marley’s 1973 song, “I Shot the Sheriff’
The image of the southern sheriff as a big-bellied, slow-witted, Yankee-hating 
racist in mirrored sunglasses remains one of America’s most enduring stereotypes; it 
persists in television, movies, and fiction. The image has even become a metaphor for 
descriptions of violent acts. A search for “southern sheriffs” on the Internet reveals news 
stories such as, “zookeepers quickly responded to the attack of the lions by turning on 
three high-pressure fire hoses, like good southern sheriffs.. . . ” An examination of the 
history of racial violence in the South from Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Movement 
reveals the origin and the validity of this stereotype. The image of the trigger-happy 
sheriff most likely began in the 1890s when lynching reached its height but became fully 
formed during the Civil Rights Movement, when accounts of sheriffs' actions appeared 
not just in newspapers, but on national television. The nation watched aggressive
3southern sheriffs brutally thwart peaceful civil rights marches. Thus, the negative image 
did not arise from Hollywood’s imagination or a writer’s whim. These club-wielding, 
tobacco-chewing figures were anything but invented. Fictional depictions of the southern 
sheriffs may seem exaggerated, but southern history offers many examples that fit the 
stereotype.
For instance, on January 26, 1921, the Union, South Carolina Progress reported
the death of James Gideon Long, who had served as Union County sheriff for twenty
years. “Former Sheriff Long,” the obituary read,
was widely known throughout this county and State, for he had served well his 
State not only in the days of the Civil War, but in the even more troublous times 
of Reconstruction days, when he did much to help restore white supremacy, he 
having been the first man in this State to organize the now famous Ku Klux Klan 
in South Carolina. At the request of Former Sheriff Long, he was buried in his 
Confederate uniform and in his hand was a small silk Confederate flag.1
Although J.G. Long served as sheriff during the late nineteenth century, the newspaper’s 
tribute to him dramatically illustrates the role and status of twentieth century southern 
sheriffs as well. Like Long, some were members of the Ku Klux Klan, participating in the 
lynching of African Americans, or at the very least, doing little to hinder white mob 
violence. Many members of their white communities often expected them to “capably” 
enforce the social order and racial caste, while blocking racial progress or equality. 
Newspapers frequently reported that a black prisoner was “taken from the sheriff’ or 
“taken from jail” by an angry crowd, revealing how easily white mobs enacted the 
southern ritual of extralegal justice. Without the complicity of their local sheriff, these
1 Long and Wilburn Family Papers, University of South Carolina.
4lynchings might not have occurred. In such cases, sheriffs played a central role in mob 
violence even if they did not participate directly in the lynching itself.
As Savannah, Georgia’s black newspaper noted at the height of the lynching 
epidemic in 1892, “The success which almost invariably attends the efforts of such 
lawless mobs, is nearly always the result of collusion with the officers of the law, and 
instances are not infrequent when sheriffs and jailors have been passive spectators, or 
active participants in these deeds of violence and blood.” According to estimates by the 
NAACP, 5,200 blacks were burned, shot, or mutilated (or a combination thereof) 
between 1890 and 1960. The death toll is most likely understated since in many cases 
southern sheriffs and other local officials, themselves aiding and abetting the lynch mobs, 
did not deem the murders significant enough to report. Although legal statutes, created 
under Reconstruction-era civil rights laws and based on the Fourteenth Amendment, 
authorized prosecutions o f public officials and law enforcement officers who committed 
or conspired with others to commit acts of racial violence, state and federal courts rarely 
invoked these statutes. Fewer than one percent of lynch mob participants were ever 
prosecuted.3
The NAACP noted that lynchings virtually disappeared from the southern 
landscape by the 1950s. However, the southern values and attitudes that gave rise to 
lynching remained, and when the Civil Rights Movement united African Americans to 
challenge the racial status quo, renewed southern violence, and sheriffs’ acquiescence in
2 Quoted in Edward Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th Century American 
South (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 245.
3 Earl Ofari Hutchinson, “The Politics of Lynching,” Salon, 31 August 2000, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/20Q0/08/31/lvnching (7 March 2001).
5it, was a likely response. Under the heading, “Why Lynching has Declined,” a 1959 
article in the Crisis observed, “Today, the terror and intimidation function, served for so 
many years by lynchings, has been assumed pretty much by law enforcement officers in 
the rural and backwoods South.”4 “Judge Lynch” was replaced by a rash of civil rights 
murders, the bombing of schools and churches, and the violent actions of southern 
sheriffs and police squads. With disturbing regularity, southern sheriffs, the “peace 
officers” responsible for quelling anti-civil rights violence, did anything but maintain 
peace.
Despite the southern sheriffs central role in southern racial history, this local law 
enforcement officer has attracted surprisingly little historical attention. And despite 
historians’ extensive studies of lynchings and racial violence in the South, they have 
remained relatively quiet on the subject of sheriffs. This paper seeks to correct this 
omission and bring the southern sheriff to the forefront of southern racial history. As Part 
I reveals, southern sheriffs provide an invaluable illustration of the slow—almost 
imperceptible—progression toward racial equality and the continuity of racial violence 
from Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Movement. By studying the most “virile” and 
“esteemed” member of local government, the person once called the “barometer of public 
opinion,” the southern racial perspective comes into clearer focus.
Part II explores the activists who attempted to expose and challenge southern 
sheriffs’ power. In the late nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth, 
individuals like Ida B. Wells and Arthur Raper, and organizations such as the National
4 John A. Morsell, “States’ Rights and States’ Wrongs,” Crisis 66 (May 1959), 269.
6Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Southern 
Commission on Lynching, and the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of 
Lynching (ASWPL), noted the central role of southern sheriffs in racial violence. They 
penned these observations in pamphlets, bulletins, and flyers in order to increase public 
awareness of the South’s law enforcement problem, and the ASWPL in particular tried to 
address the problem of sheriffs’ complicity in lynching by sending each member to 
obtain her local sheriffs signature on an anti-lynching petition.
Part III focuses on James G. Clark of Selma, Alabama, and Lawrence Rainey of 
Philadelphia, Mississippi, two sheriffs of the Deep South whose violent attempts to 
thwart African Americans’ pursuit of voting rights attracted national attention during the 
Civil Rights Movement. The sheriffs’ role in the Movement reveals that the passage of a 
century had neither changed the support and protection that the sheriff received from 
parts of the white community and local officials, nor the prominent status of the office. 
And, like some of their predecessors, Clark and Rainey continued to serve as “defenders 
o f the caste system.”
Valuable historical accounts of the Movement have focused on important leaders, 
major national organizations, and significant events, but have never focused on those 
sheriffs whose extremist viewpoints and actions had a direct effect on the Movement’s 
goals and on how events such as the Selma march unfolded. For example, the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC) chose to begin their Alabama voter registration drive in Selma, 
largely due to Sheriff Clark’s reputation as a violent reactionary. Martin Luther King 
candidly admitted that the success of the voting rights campaign depended in large part
7on provoking violence. Clark was the individual that the campaign was trying to provoke. 
While Sheriff Rainey did not have Clark’s national reputation, he played a significant 
role in the killing and cover-up of the three rights workers. In addition, the subsequent 
nationally-headlined FBI investigation exposed several other incidents of racial violence 
linked to Rainey’s office.
Both men certainly represent the most egregious examples of racist southern 
sheriffs. Indeed, Clark and Rainey are most likely responsible for establishing the 
stereotype of the southern sheriff. Through television broadcasts and newspaper 
headlines, Clark and Rainey’s uncannily similar appearances provided the nation with 
hundreds of vivid images of the southern sheriff as an overweight, tobacco-chewing, gun- 
toting thug. But, it was their excesses that ultimately provoked voting reforms and made 
the southern sheriffs office a position for caretakers of the law rather than of the color 
line.
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From The Crisis, January 1935, page 27.
Southern sheriffs have enjoyed an elevated community status since the inception 
of the office in the colonial era. In the mid-seventeenth century Chesapeake, the governor 
selected sheriffs from an exclusive group of substantial landholders to serve for one or 
two years. As large property owners, these men were already members of a political and
9social elite, but their appointment to the shrievalty further increased their power and 
importance within their communities. Similarly, as a 1960s study of the southern sheriffs 
office argued, the mid-twentieth century sheriff, though elected on a partisan basis for a 
four-year term, was “likely to be politically one of the most esteemed persons in the 
county.”5 Especially in rural areas, an intricate web of family ties and local loyalties 
bound citizens to law officers. Many of the sheriffs white constituents viewed him as a 
prestigious member of the community, in part because the machinery of local 
government was otherwise weak, and in part because they were grateful and indebted to 
the man largely responsible for maintaining the color line. Similar to the way in which 
southern colonial courts insured respect for the office of sheriff by levying a fine or 
publicly whipping anyone who abused the local sheriff, an early twentieth century 
southern town might perceive the wounding or killing of their county sheriff, especially if 
instigated by a black person, as an attack on the white community at large, and therefore, 
in some cases, as license for public mob violence.6
The official responsibilities of the office of sheriff — preserving the peace, 
enforcing the law, making arrests, supervising prisoners, operating jails, serving civil 
processes, and collecting taxes— also remained much the same since the seventeenth 
century. A few differences existed; for example, beginning in the early nineteenth 
century, sheriffs were elected by their county’s voters, not appointed by the state
5 Dana B. Brammer and James E. Hurley, A Study o f the Office o f Sheriff in the United States, Southern 
Region (Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Mississippi, 1968), 20.
6 Bruce Smith, Rural Crime Control (New York: Institute of Public Administration, Columbia 
University, 1933), 43; C.H. Karracker, Seventeenth Century Sheriff (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1930), 66-69; W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 
1880-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 76-77; National Sheriffs’ Association 
http://www.sheriffs.org/defaults/defaults s links.htm (14 March 2002).
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governor. The mid-twentieth century sheriff was no longer responsible for apprehending 
fugitive slaves or managing elections, but instead acted in most states as the executive 
officer of the state’s courts. Sheriffs furnished or served as bailiff, summoned witnesses, 
and cared for jurors. Time did not alter the majority of the contemporary office’s duties, 
and like his historical counterpart, the mid-twentieth century sheriff was the most “virile 
part of county government.” Beginning in the late nineteenth century, industrialization 
and urbanization led many cities to establish their own law enforcement agency. In some 
counties, the sheriff would leave municipal law enforcement to municipal police 
departments while he served the rural areas. However, despite a jurisdictional distinction 
between the city police force and the sheriff and his deputies, sheriffs remained the 
South’s chief law enforcement officers.7
Just as the elevated status and official responsibilities of the sheriffs office have 
survived the passage of centuries, so has evidence of corruption within the position. 
Abuse of the office began almost immediately upon its inception in the colonies. A 
commentator on the office in North Carolina declared that “no other single officer in the 
county exercised such plenary executive and administrative powers as did the colonial 
sheriff. Nor did any other officer make for misrule quite so much as the sheriff.” One 
scholar has argued that the limited tenure of the colonial office was not based on 
democratic doctrines, but on the premise that the sheriffs office encompassed duties that 
were easily susceptible of abuse. Indeed, numerous complaints of corruption in the 
sheriffs office prompted reform legislation in Maryland in 1678. This legislation limited
7 “most virile part”: Brammer, 1-2, 20; National Sheriffs’ Association 
http://www.sheriffs.org/defaults/defaults s links.htm (14 March 2002).
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the sheriff to a single one-year term unless a certificate from county court attested to the
o
“honest and efficient execution of office during the preceding year.”
Two duties in particular rendered the office vulnerable to scandal. As the local 
tax collector, the sheriff held a desirable and highly lucrative position, for in many 
counties the sheriff was authorized to keep ten percent of the taxes he collected as his 
personal poundage. Extortions, embezzlement, and irregular settlements with the county 
treasurer were common. Furthermore, as manager of local elections, the sheriff had a 
powerful political influence. Expected to be impartial, sheriffs were not allowed to vote 
in elections over which they presided except to break a tie, but they possessed 
considerable ability to influence the outcome of elections. The sheriff opened and closed 
the poll when he pleased, sometimes ignoring the pleas of a candidate who wanted to 
keep it open until more voters arrived. He set the day for the election, often taking into 
consideration which day would best suit his favored candidates. He had the right to 
decide whether individual voters were properly qualified, and in some cases, voter 
qualifications could be based solely on the political whims of the sheriff. In a 1756 
election in Augusta County, Virginia, for example, the sheriff was accused of denying a 
vote to those Freeholders who did not select his preferred candidate. However, even 
when he supervised an election with decorum and fairness, the power of the sheriff made 
an impartial vote rather challenging. Each voter had to declare his vote to the sheriff, and 
if the sheriff was known to favor a particular candidate, some voters might have been 
unduly swayed by the man sitting before them. Not surprisingly, the sheriffs control over
Smith, 44-45; Karracker, 86-88.
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the conduct of elections was thus so complete that he was frequently able to return to the 
colonial Assembly the person of his choice rather than that of the electorate.9
Although supplemented with court-commissioned slave patrols by the 
Revolutionary era, the county sheriff was also responsible for enforcing fugitive slave 
laws. In late seventeenth century South Carolina, for example, lawmakers attempted to 
restrain the growing slave population with the 1690 “Act for the Better Ordering of 
Slaves,” which mandated that the entire white population was required to act as a 
community police force and apprehend runaways. These captured slaves would then be 
turned over to their owners or to the local sheriff. In contrast, the Virginia legislature 
realized that the white community alone could not catch enough fleeing bondsmen, and 
ordered sheriffs to raise whatever force appeared necessary to apprehend fugitive 
slaves.10
Corruption in the southern sheriffs office in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries revolved primarily around abuses of an economic and political nature, but 
beginning in the post-Reconstruction South, abuses became more apparent within the 
social—or, more specifically, racial—fabric of southern society. It is not surprising that 
the ffeedmen recognized little difference between the legal violence inflicted upon them 
by slave patrollers and the extralegal violence used by white law enforcement officials 
and the “offspring” of the patrol, the Ku Klux Klan, formed in 1865. Certainly, a fine line 
separated the patrols from the latter two groups, both of which simply replaced their
9 Charles S. Sydnor, American Revolutionaries in the Making{New York: Free Press, 1968), 24-25, 68- 
69.
10 Hadden, 17-18,28.
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predecessor in the quest for black subordination, except after emancipation, restraints 
upon mobility, socialization, and property ownership were achieved without official legal 
sanction, and with more violence. Former slaves claimed that sheriffs and the Klan 
worked simultaneously with patrollers, or described the brutality of each group 
interchangeably. Thus, the ffeedmen’s inability to detect the transition from legal to 
extralegal violence not only provides the most telling indication of the patrol’s violent 
legacy, but speaks again to the acquiescence of southern sheriffs in upholding the 
antebellum racial regime.11
The abolition of slavery forced some southern whites to rely increasingly upon 
extralegal measures in order to ensure the political, economic, and social subordination of 
their former bondsmen. Historians of the South have noted that in contrast to the North, 
where accelerated economic development and urban growth promoted the creation of 
courts and law enforcement agencies that worked to preserve social order and suppress 
violence, the South did not develop comparable institutions to discourage disorder. 
Furthermore, while the ethos of “dignity” and self-restraint prevailed in the North, the 
South adhered to an ethic of “honor” and had a long tradition of “self-help,” a willingness 
to use violence without waiting for an official legal sanction. Historian Edward Ayers 
argues that the ethic of honor not only influenced relationships within white society, but 
dictated the color line, requiring blacks’ unfeigned deference to whites. When honor was 
breached—as evidenced by a display of disobedience or even an “uppity” glance— 
southerners preferred that honor be rectified through personal, or extralegal, justice rather
11 Hadden, 28, 40, 211-16.
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than through the impersonal third party of the state. Thus, honor, slavery, and the residual
frontier system entwined in the South to create a wariness of powerful legal institutions
1 0and caused many to doubt the value of centralized justice and law enforcement.
However, southerners did not doubt the value of local law enforcement, for a 
sheriff, as “caretaker of the color line” and “defender of the caste system,” generally 
shared the racial attitudes of his white constituents, who expected their local sheriff to 
enforce, or at least not ignore, a community’s insistence upon the preservation of white 
supremacy.13 In the South, public opinion counted far more heavily than the law, and no 
one was more influenced by public sentiment than the county sheriff. A sheriff did not 
like to offend a white voter if it could be helped. He knew that his ability to subordinate 
the black population, or “keep them in their place,” was a “political asset,” an “informal 
obligation” of his position.14 Beginning in the post-Reconstruction South, the elected 
nature of the sheriffs office became a particularly noticeable liability, for during a time 
when racial disorder in the South demanded the intervention of law enforcement, many 
sheriffs adhered to the will of the majority rather than the rule of the law.
12 Edward Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th Century American South 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). See Chapter on “Honor and its Adversaries.” Bertram Wyatt- 
Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford University Press,
1982). See Chapter 14: “Honor, Shame, and Justice in a Slavocracy.” Philip Dray, At the Hands o f Persons 
Unknown: The Lynching o f Black America (New York: Random House, 2002), 30-31; Sally E. Hadden, 
Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 208.
13 John Dittmer, Black Georgia in the Progressive Era, 1900-1920 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1977), 139.
14 Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary R. Gardner, Deep South: A Social Anthropological 
Study o f Caste and Class (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1941; 2d ed. abridged, Phoenix Books, 1965), 
287.
15
Reconstruction and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment raised black expectations, but the semblance of equal justice that they 
achieved proved short-lived. For example, black men held federal, state, and local public 
offices, including the office of sheriff, but the overthrow of the last Radical 
Reconstruction governments in 1877 ended this brief effort at achieving racial equality.15 
Furthermore, economic dependence, political setbacks, and unpunished white violence 
took their toll. Southern racial codes, habits, and customs could not be changed by “paper 
laws.” Instead, the South adhered to what one Mississippi lawyer deemed “negro law,” a 
law about which “no book on earth [could] shed the faintest ray of light, but had to be 
learned by experience and observation.” For example, if  a black person killed a white 
man, according to “negro law” he would suffer death “in some form or other, the time, 
place, and manner of his execution depending altogether on who caught him, the sheriffs 
posse or the friends of the deceased.”16 Often maintained through violence, the southern 
racial code and the reassertion of white power over black lives were nowhere more 
evident than in the acquiescence of sheriffs in enforcing white supremacy.
By the late 1880s, when the wave of racial violence in the South climaxed, the 
collusion of sheriffs and other law enforcement officials with lynchers became such a 
problem that after 1892 a number of states adopted legislative or constitutional provisions 
designed to end this public ritual of racial violence. For example, in 1901 the Alabama 
Constitution stated that “whenever any prisoner is taken from jail, or from the custody of
15 Eric Foner, Freedom’s Lawmakers: A Directory o f Black Officeholders During Reconstruction (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), xi, xv. During Reconstruction, especially in counties with a sizable 
black population, blacks held some local offices. There were at least 41 black sheriffs.
16 Leon Litwack, Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age o f Jim Crow (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, l 998), 230.
16
any sheriff or his deputy and put to death or suffers grievous bodily harm, owing to the
neglect, connivance, cowardice, or other grave fault of the sheriff, such sheriff may be
impeached.”17 However, measures such as these were largely ineffective, in part because
“paper laws” could not withstand the pressure of southern custom.
Southern sheriffs also played a prominent role in involuntary servitude. Peonage,
like lynching, was a legacy of slavery, and stemmed from the ideological conviction that
blacks only understood force, whether expressed through the rope and faggot or the
coercion of debt. This system of debt servitude, which lasted well into the twentieth
century, offered a means of controlling black laborers by ensuring that agricultural
laborers would remain mired in debt and thus deprived of mobility. Southern sheriffs
could thwart even their smallest efforts to leave a region that offered them little, if any,
cash income. According to Junius Gaten, a black man who moved from the South to
Chicago in 1905, southern sheriffs burned copies of the Chicago Defender, the nation’s
largest black newspaper and the first to urge southern blacks to move to the North,
because “they didn’t want people finding out about Chicago and freedom.” Copies of the
paper were therefore carefully guarded, and porters on the Illinois Central Railroad,
which ran from Chicago’s Michigan Avenue to the Black Belt of the South, sneaked
copies of the Defender for their family in the South. Gaten noted that these copies “would
18be passed from hand to hand until the pages were all raggedy, falling apart.”
17 James Harmon Chadboum, Lynching and the Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1933; reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970), 64.
18 Ron Grossman, “Exodus to Freedom: Southern Blacks Found Haven Here,” Chicago Tribune, 12 Feb. 
1995, p. C-l.
17
Although not always enforced, laws existed that penalized a laborer for 
abandoning his job after signing a contract. By 1907, nearly every southern state 
legislature had passed a contract-labor measure that resembled the black codes of 
Reconstruction. Under such laws, if a laborer abandoned his job after signing a contract, 
he could be arrested for a criminal offense. In some cases, one could be arrested for 
simply being black and unemployed. As the Virginia Bulletin noted in 1937, “In 
Greenville, South Carolina the planters have requested the law enforcement officers to 
round up all unemployed, able-bodied men and prosecute them for vagrancy if they 
refuse cotton-picking jobs.”19 As this quote illustrates and as historian Pete Daniels 
asserts, collusion between sheriffs and planters was common throughout the South. While 
state and local law favored employers, peonage stemmed more from custom than law, 
and was often reinforced by violence.20
The story of James Felton, a victim of peonage, not only indicates the extreme 
violence which black laborers suffered, and the vague, at times imperceptible, distinction 
between slavery and debt servitude, but the collusion of sheriffs and planters in keeping 
the “free” black population enslaved. Felton’s affidavit to the Georgia state authorities in 
1926 revealed a common practice. Sheriffs would arrest vagrant black laborers, hold 
them in jail until the planter arrived, and then allow the employer to handle his 
“employee” however he chose. Felton said that five black laborers were killed after 
attempting to escape from “Dr. King’s” farm. The sheriff and his deputies brought them
19 NAACP Papers, Part 10, 16:466.
20 Pete Daniels, The Shadow o f Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1972); William Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial 
Control, 1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991).
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back, telling King, “Here are these sons of bitches that tried to get away from you; take 
them back and give them what they need.” Felton reported that they were then given 
severe beatings, and that the next day, Dr. King said he ‘“was afraid to keep them, they 
weren’t any good except to try to get away and he thought he’d better do away with 
them.’ He then shot one, killed one with an axe, John Dowdy [his black overseer] killed 
one with an axe, and Dr. King’s nephew shot two. I saw all of these killings and had to 
help take the bodies to be buried.” Asserting that the servitude practiced on the farm was 
known to the county sheriff who frequently visited the place, Felton noted bitterly, “Even 
the public officials of this town seem to be hired or working for Dr. King, as all seem to 
take orders from him.”21 By aiding the preservation of the peonage system, the sheriff 
functioned as an “agent of the planter” rather than as an agent of the law. That is, 
because sheriffs did not recognize the blacks’ freedom but adhered to the legacy of 
bondage, peonage victims could not expect to receive help from their local law 
enforcement official.
Similarly, just as the sheriff often ignored local evidence of peonage, he turned a 
blind eye to the composition of an angry crowd. In order for extralegal justice to function 
effectively in the South, a reciprocal relationship had to exist between the sheriff and his 
community. They protected each other from punishment for their extralegal activities, 
becoming partners in the crimes conducted in the name of law and order. A state or local 
political leader rarely chose to condemn a lynching, for like the sheriff, he, too, was an
21 NAACP Papers, Part 10, 17:316.
22 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1962), 536.
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elected official ever-conscious of his constituents’ racial attitudes and their obvious 
influence upon his political career. As the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, 
appointed by President Harry Truman in 1946, wrote in their report, “Punishment of 
lynchers is not accepted as the responsibility of state or local governments in these 
[southern] communities. Frequently, state officials participate in the crime, actively or 
passively.” However, on the rare occasion when a governor or other political leader 
attempted to punish a sheriff for ignoring his sworn duty to protect all prisoners, the 
sheriffs community responded by refusing to bring indictments against him, or at least 
swearing to their sheriffs outstanding leadership and judgment.
Not only were state political leaders often indifferent toward or reluctant to 
condemn the South’s extralegal activity, but some southern whites simply refused to 
punish their sheriff for upholding the color line, an act they deemed praiseworthy. Few 
southern whites questioned their sheriffs interpretation of his duty to maintain public 
order as a license to summarily punish or abuse blacks. Rather, they felt a sense of debt 
and obligation to the man responsible for much of the violence that defined black 
degradation. The sheriff reciprocated his constituents’ allegiance by refusing to identify 
the members of a mob, noting that he “did not recognize” any of them, or that he had “no 
information as to the identity” of the lynchers. Mob members felt confident that their 
sheriff would not interfere with their violent purpose, for as Walter White wrote in 1918
23 To Secure These Rights: The Report o f the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1947), 23.
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during his tenure as president of the NAACP, law enforcement officers were “all too 
frequently in sympathy with the lynchers.”24
The lynching of Edward Johnson, a black man accused of raping a young white 
girl in Chattanooga, Tennessee, in 1906 and the subsequent arrest of Sheriff Joseph Shipp 
vividly illustrate the bonds of mutual obligation shared by a community and its sheriff, 
and similarly, the protection and prestige sheriffs received when they upheld their 
“informal obligation” of enforcing white supremacy. The day before Johnson was to be 
legally executed, U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan announced that the 
court would hear Johnson’s appeal on the grounds that he had been denied his 
constitutional rights by a careless defense and a perfunctory conviction. The Chattanooga 
News printed word of the appeal and the ensuing stay of execution late that same day, and 
as a result, within hours, twelve men broke into Johnson’s jail cell and killed him by 
hanging and shooting him. Although Sheriff Shipp and Deputy Sheriff Jeremiah Gibson 
had not participated in the lynching, the Supreme Court found them guilty o f contempt of 
court, as the appeal had granted Johnson federal prisoner status. As Chief Justice Melville 
Fuller wrote in the court’s majority opinion, “Shipp’s failure to make the slightest 
preparation to resist the mob, and his failure to make any reasonable effort to save 
Johnson or identify the members of the mob, justify the inference of a disposition upon 
his part to render it easy for the mob to lynch Johnson, and to acquiesce in the 
lynching.”25
24 Walter White, Rope and Faggot: A Biography o f Judge Lynch (reprint, Salem, NH: Ayer Company 
Publishers, 1992), 179.
25 United States v. Shipp, 29 S. Ct. 636 (1908); “Chronology of Shipp Case,” Chattanooga Times, 16 
Nov. 1909, p. 1.
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In other words, despite the fact that there had been many lynching threats even 
before the case had been brought to the Supreme Court, Shipp and his deputy had left the 
jail unguarded. Countering Shipp’s argument that mob violence was not expected, Fuller 
called such an assertion “unreasonable and inconsistent with statements made by Sheriff 
Shipp and his deputies that they were looking for a mob on the next day.” Continuing to 
assert his innocence, or perhaps simply offer a justification for the actions of Johnson’s 
lynchers, Shipp used a common defense. Southerners often blamed lynching on the 
inefficiency of the southern court system, arguing that it contained so many delays and 
procedural defects that lynch law was the only recourse to ensure justice. As Shipp 
himself told the Birmingham Age-Herald, “The people of Hamilton County were willing 
to let the law take its course, until it became known that the case would not probably be 
disposed of for four or five years by the Supreme Court. The people would not submit to 
this, and I do not wonder at it.”26 Agreeing with the opinion of his Chattanooga 
constituents, Shipp believed that there was not only a proper time for legal procedure, but 
a right time for extralegal justice.
This case marked the first time that a white citizen, let alone a law enforcement 
officer, was jailed for acquiescence in a black lynching. However, Shipp and his fellow 
defendants were only imprisoned for ninety days, and in smaller print under the headline 
o f “Sheriff Shipp Now in Washington Jail,” the New York Times noted their “pleasant 
prison quarters” and that the “first men in jail for contempt of United States Supreme
26 Richard Maxwell Brown, Strain o f Violence: Historical Studies o f American Violence and Vigilantism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 159; New York Times, 25 May 1909.
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Court even have Private Bath.” The article observed that these Tennessee men were 
housed in the most “humanitarian” part of the jail: the brand new female prison quarters. 
Detailing the room’s measurements, the configuration of furniture, the private bathroom, 
and the “four large circular windows” that gave “excellent views,” the journalist also 
described Shipp’s nonchalant, relaxed approach to his confinement: “Sitting on his straw 
bed, half reclining on his pillow of straw, Captain Shipp made this statement: ‘We are 
very well pleased with the treatment given us by Warden McKee, and are delighted with
97the quarters assigned us.’”
If the Times expressed surprise and veiled contempt at the prisoners’ privileged 
treatment, Shipp’s community, though distraught that their respected sheriff was 
imprisoned at all, expressed “relief’ and approval over the lightness of his sentence. 
According to the local press, Shipp, whose constituents had recently reelected him by the 
largest majority ever given a Hamilton County Democrat, “went to his imprisonment 
with the full confidence of the people of this county.” As an editorial in the Chattanooga 
Times noted, the stigma typically attached to a jail sentence would be eliminated in 
Shipp’s case, for in the eyes of a “large number” of his constituents, he was not guilty. 
When Shipp and the other five defendants left to receive their sentence in Washington, 
crowds lining the streets applauded them, and in the courtroom, a throng of friends “sat 
as close as they could get” to Shipp and company, and then followed them to the jail, 
providing special bedding and “every other possible arrangement for their comfort.” For 
those who had to rely on local newspaper reports, the incorrect story that Shipp took his 
conviction “very much to heart,” and that “he had dropped dead when he received his
27 New York Times, 16 Nov. 1909, p. 1.
23
sentence . . . caused much excitement until it was proved untrue.” In fact, the opposite 
occurred. The Chattanooga Times reported that Shipp’s “erect figure and striking 
countenance attracted to him the greatest attention. He was without showing of emotion 
and heard his sentence without a quaver.”28
Chattanooga’s city council members sent Shipp and his associates telegrams of 
sympathy, and over five thousand people, including the mayors of several Tennessee 
cities, signed petitions requesting Shipp’s pardon from President Taft. Some requested 
the pardon not because of the sheriffs prominent position or his presumed innocence, but 
because they feared the effect of the sentence on white women’s safety. Just as an 
editorial in the local paper worried that the Supreme Court’s decision might give the 
Negro “license to exploit his vices,” indulging carelessly in “his bestial tastes,” concerned 
citizens from Georgia mimicked this familiar cry of the protection of white womanhood, 
expressing their “grave fear the effect that the fulfillment of the sentence will have upon 
the ignorant and irresponsible negroes, increasing beyond question the danger to the 
women of the South.” In addition, because Shipp was a Confederate veteran, his 
conviction gained him further support and sympathy. A former Confederate general, 
calling attention to the loyalty of former Confederate soldiers to the government and 
criticizing the imprisonment of former Sheriff Shipp, ordered every veterans’ camp in 
Arkansas to prepare petitions to President Taft asking for Shipp’s pardon.29
28 New York Times, 16 Nov. 1909, p. 2; Chattanooga Times, 16 Nov. 1909, pp. 1, 4; 17 Nov. 1909, p. 3.
29 Chattanooga Times, 16 Nov. 1909, p. 4; Quoted in New York Times, 18 Nov. 1909, p. 1; New York 
Times, 18 Nov. 1909, p. 9.
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In stark contrast to Shipp, who received community support when he surrendered 
a prisoner to the mob, a sheriff who warded off a mob was almost certain to face 
condemnation from his community. Punishment often arrived through the power of the 
vote, for a sheriffs constituents could voice their criticism by ensuring his defeat for 
reelection. For example, in Carroll County, Georgia, in 1901, Sheriff Joseph Merrill 
attracted national attention by opening fire on a mob that attacked the county jail. The 
black prisoner, accused of killing a young white boy, was sentenced to death, but on the 
day of the scheduled hanging, an appeal to the Supreme Court delayed his execution. A 
large crowd had come to town to witness the hanging, and upon learning of the delay, 
they “crystallized in the formation of a mob” and assaulted the jail. They demanded that 
Merrill hand them the key to the prisoner’s cell, but Merrill refused to comply with their 
request and warned them that shots would be fired if they did not leave the building. 
Despite his orders, they advanced down the corridor, and when one of Merrill’s deputies 
killed a member of the mob, the “unexpected fight of the sheriff’ caused the crowd’s 
retreat. Merrill’s “reward” for checking the mob and standing up to southern tradition 
was defeat in the next election. However, a Georgia congressman brought Merrill’s brave 
stand to the attention of Theodore Roosevelt, who found him a job as custodian of the 
federal prison grounds in Atlanta. Roosevelt later requested that the Attorney General 
ensure that the director of the prison grant Merrill a promotion.30
In some cases, however, even those sheriffs who wanted to uphold their oath of 
office were unable to quell a mob. Because lynch mobs included members of the “county
30 New York Times, 8 June 1901, p. 1; 20 Dec. 1906; Atlanta Journal, 8-9 June 1901, p. 1.
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seat elites” who controlled local political life, the influence and will of the community 
sometimes seemed an insurmountable obstacle. It was the presence of these “men of 
property” that “tipped the balance” against sheriffs who sought to buck southern 
tradition, and the sheriff simply submitted to what appeared inevitable. For example, in 
1906, one peace officer noted that he “went into that cell block with every intention of 
fulfilling my oath and protecting that man, but when the mob opened the door, the first
half a dozen men standing there were leading citizens—businessmen, leaders of their
• ^ 1churches and the community—I just couldn’t do it.”
Community support for a lynching, whether endorsed by “men of property” or
not, threatened a sheriff’s capacity to protect a black prisoner. Sheriff W.M Waltrip tried
to protect two black prisoners who had been accused of arson in Franklin County,
Alabama, in 1891 but refused to sacrifice his own life when protection seemed useless.
While informing the governor that he was “heartily opposed to mob law,” he admitted to
the community’s victory, noting that the “hanging of these firefiends has the endorsement
of the larger portion of the people, black and white, of this county.” Thirty years later, the
Nation printed a similar story of a lynching in Nodena County, Arkansas. Plans for a
black prisoner’s execution had been widely published, but Sheriff Dwight Blackwood
made no attempt to prevent the lynching, for “nearly every man, woman and child in our
county wanted the Negro lynched. When public sentiment is that way, there isn’t much
chance left for the officers.” Blackwood and his predecessor may have simply feared
31 Quoted in Jacquelyn Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry: Jesse Daniel Ames and the Women’s Campaign 
Against Lynching {New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 140.
32 Quoted in Litwack, 296; White, 25.
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political suicide rather than physical danger, but regardless o f their primary motivation 
for surrendering the prisoners, the will of the community prevailed.
The stories of Merrill and Waltrip illustrate that not all southern sheriffs condoned 
extralegal justice; many attempted to protect their prisoners and judiciously enforce the 
law. Sheriffs like Merrill and Shipp represent opposite ends of the spectrum, but they 
nevertheless offer similar insights into the southern racial system and sheriffs’ role in it. 
Since the inception of the office in the colonial era, the sheriff held a prominent status 
within the white southern community. As tax collector, local election manager, and 
enforcer of fugitive slave laws, for example, the sheriff was an influential, powerful, and 
often corrupt figure. Beginning in the post-Reconstruction South, corruption within the 
office extended to the racial fabric of southern society, as many members of the white 
community expected their local law enforcement officer to ensure continued black 
subordination.
When sheriffs like Merrill attempted to defend a black prisoner, they blatantly 
defied such expectations and the “informal obligation” of their position. That is, in order 
for extralegal justice to function effectively, a reciprocal relationship had to exist between 
a sheriff and those members of the white community who endorsed mob violence. They 
became partners in enforcing the racial caste system. If a sheriff tried to avert a lynching, 
he upset the balance, or reciprocity, and thus forfeited the prestige and power ascribed to 
his office. Conversely, if  as in Shipp’s case, a sheriff left a jail unguarded or ignored an 
angry mob, many of his white constituents protected him from punishment. Therefore, 
community support for a lynching typically dictated the sheriffs response. Disregarding
27
his own viewpoint regarding mob violence, the sheriff was heavily influenced by public 
opinion and knew that his ability to uphold the color line was a political asset.
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PART II
ACTIVISM: EXPOSING AND CHALLENGING SOUTHERN SHERIFFS’ POWER
“How does it come about that these mobs, composed invariably of white men and none 
others, cannot be put down by the white authorities? . .  .the sheriffs upon whom the 
custody of such persons depends are chosen by popular election, and usually have no 
backbone.. .  there are few cases where a determined sheriff, armed and ready to do his 
duty, could not quell a mob.”
Historian Albert Bushnell Hart, The Southern South, 1912
In the late nineteenth century, activists began to condemn southern sheriffs’ 
central role in racial violence, expressing horror at the South’s “growing disregard of 
human life.” Ida Wells-Bamett, an African American who achieved national and 
international fame as a journalist, public speaker, and community activist, launched an 
anti-lynching campaign in the 1890s after “there came a lynching in Memphis which 
changed the whole course of my life.”33 Law enforcement officers in Memphis, 
Tennessee, allowed a white mob to take three of her closest friends from jail and lynch 
them. While certainly recognizing that lynching was not just a southern phenomenon, 
Wells-Bamett’s writings focused on southern examples of mob mle and sheriffs’
33 Alfreda M. Duster, ed., Crusade for Justice: The Autobiography o f Ida B. Wells (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1970), 47. Chapter 6, “Lynching at the Curve,” discusses the Memphis lynching.
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acquiescence in it. Her target audience was those “men and women of the South who 
disapprove of lynching,” for supporters of mob rule most likely would not have listened 
to the words of a black woman, a member of the very race whose subjugation they 
enforced. Thus, Wells criticized those who quietly disapproved but failed to act, deeming 
them “accomplices . . . equally guilty with the actual law-breakers.” She reminded them 
that their “silence encourages a continuance of this sort of horror” and that endorsers of 
extralegal measures would “persist” as long as they knew that they would “never be 
called to an account.” In part, this confidence was sustained because the “moral support 
of those chosen by the people to execute the law, is frequently given to the support of 
lawlessness and mob violence.”34
Wells criticized the mockery of justice that existed in the South, a land where race 
was more powerful than law, where criminal accusations, arrests, and verdicts were based 
less on evidence of guilt than on the skin color o f the defendant. Sheriffs were bound to 
execute the decrees of the law, not the racially-driven whims of the community, but 
“submission to mob reign” rather than protection of prisoners typically ruled. Lynchings 
commonly began when defendants were “taken from the sheriff’ or “given to the mob by 
the sheriff,” and any attempts to stop mob rule were feeble if they occurred at all. As 
Wells illustrates with numerous examples, mobs could have been dispersed, but the 
sheriff would “insist that no violence be done,” or would not “lift a hand to stop the 
proceedings after the jail door yielded.”35
34 Jacqueline Jones Royster, ed., Southern Horrors and Other Writings: The Anti-Lynching Campaign of  
Ida B. Wells, 1892-1900 (Boston: Bedford Books, 1997), 206, 92.
35 Ibid., 113-14.
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Furthermore, Wells noted, the sheriff and his constituents each protected the 
extralegal actions of the other, refusing to break the unspoken code of silence that 
preserved white supremacy. For example, when a black family was brutally shot in 
Arkansas, the local paper detailed the circumstances leading up to the attack. Six months 
after this publication, a resident of Chicago wrote to find out if any of the parties 
involved in the killing had been arrested. He received a signed reply from the county 
sheriff, who briefly stated that “the parties have never been arrested, and are still in the 
county. It was done by some of the citizens, and those who know will not tell.”36 The 
sheriffs willingness to reply to an outside inquiry at all perhaps suggests his desire to 
explain that public attitudes made it impossible for him to apprehend the criminals. 
However, Wells believed that the sheriffs reply revealed his support of the lynching, or 
at least his apathetic unwillingness to question the rule of the mob.
Wells believed that the success of her campaign would be marked not so much by 
better law enforcement or national anti-lynching legislation, as by a change in public 
opinion. By speaking forthrightly about mob violence, and by detailing lurid lynchings, 
she could boldly intervene in public discourse and reach the white people of the country 
who possessed the power, authority, and resources to stop such “demonstrations of 
American barbarism.”37 Certainly, the legal history of anti-lynching activities indicates 
the practicality of her goals, for state efforts to end extralegal justice were largely 
ineffective, and on a national level, Congress failed to pass the Blair Bill, the Dyer Bill,
36 Ibid., 91.
37 Ibid., 206.
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or any other legislation that would stem the tide of violence. However, the significance of 
her writings lies in their primacy, for she was the first publicly to place mob violence on 
the American agenda. Later, groups such as the Commission on Interracial Cooperation 
(CIC), the Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching, and the Association of 
Southern Women on the Prevention of Lynching (ASWPL) added collective resistance to 
her single voice. These groups did not change laws either, but they succeeded in forcing 
national attention to and debate of the issues.
The CIC, organized in 1920 by Will Alexander, a white Methodist minister from 
Tennessee, never sought to challenge segregation or advocate racial equality, but to bring 
moderate leaders of both races together in an organization that advocated improved 
housing, equal educational opportunities, and an end to mob violence. After a year of 
effort, Alexander proclaimed that racial tensions had been reduced in places where the 
CIC had worked. However, in the fall of 1930, Alexander decided that the CIC strategy 
of local interracial committees was foundering. Although lynching had slowly declined 
since the year of the commission’s founding, in 1930, the lynching rate doubled. 
Alexander decided to reinvigorate the commission’s anti-lynching drive by replacing 
local activism with research, documenting the region’s ills and challenging white 
southern intellectuals’ traditional defense of regional institutions and mores. Obviously, 
lynching, the violent outgrowth of white supremacy, one of the South’s most enduring 
ideologies, was a prime topic for these new southern sociologists. At the height of the 
lynching epidemic in the late nineteenth century, the Tuskegee Institute and the NAACP 
had begun collecting and publicizing lynching statistics, but the CIC wanted to broaden 
such research by examining the social origins of extralegal racial violence. The group
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hoped that exposing the realities behind the myths of lynching would serve as an 
effective means of eliminating the most extreme form of racial violence. Therefore, it 
established the Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching and chose sociologist 
Arthur Raper to fulfill the task.38
Raper’s work has remained the standard text on the subject, and certainly, his 
analysis of the common characteristics of mob members, lynched victims, and the 
counties involved provided an important first look at salient facts of the epidemic. What 
historians have generally overlooked, however, is his analysis of sheriffs’ collusion with 
mobs and the influence of political considerations on their actions. In the first chapter of 
The Tragedy o f  Lynching, “Facts about Lynching in 1930,” Raper included a section on 
county sheriffs and their deputies, noting that “in most cases the sheriff and his deputies 
merely stood by while the mob did its work.” Some did not even try to disguise their 
complacency behind claims that the mob had taken them by surprise or that they were 
unwilling to shoot into the crowd for fear o f killing innocent men, women, and children. 
One Georgia sheriff noted that he was glad that the “damn nigger” was dead. “Except for 
my oath and bond,” he added, “I’d have killed him myself as soon as they brought him 
within shooting distance of the jail.”39
Furthermore, Raper noted the bonds of obligation that existed between a sheriff 
and his community. As Raper illustrated in one of his chapters, a case study entitled, 
“Sheriff Keeps Faith With Mob,” sheriffs not only failed to resist the mob, but also
f
38 Hall, 160.
39 Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy o f Lynching (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, 1969), 13.
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feigned ignorance as to the identities of the mob members. Following a lynching in 
Thomasville, Georgia, in 1930, the sheriff reported under oath to a grand jury that he did 
not recognize a single member of the “party or parties . . . responsible for [the Negro’s] 
death.” In response, the coroner’s jury commended their sheriff for the “quiet and orderly 
manner” in which he handled the angry crowd, and for upholding his duty “in every 
respect.”40
In stark contrast to such praise, Raper noted, was the open condemnation sheriffs 
received when they defied the will of the community. When an Ocilla, Georgia, sheriff 
somehow disobeyed the instructions of the mob who had asked him to “take charge” of a 
prisoner, his car was fired upon, and a bullet hole ruptured the car’s gas tank. In another 
Georgia case, a sheriff, trying to prevent mob violence at a prisoner’s trial, persistently 
pretended ignorance of the date the man would be tried. When the sentence had been 
given and the prisoner removed, many local citizens expressed open criticism of the 
sheriff for not letting “the people” know when the prisoner would be brought before the
4 1court.
Raper attributed the characteristic indifference as well as the uncharacteristic 
concern of peace officers to the “influence of political consideration.” Elected by the 
local people, sheriffs usually conformed their official acts to the expressed desires of the 
local electorate. And since mob members were nearly all voters, and the victim and most 
members of his race were politically impotent, sheriffs adhered to the wishes of his 
constituency. Raper noted that while the National Guard could be instrumental in
40 Ibid., 242.
41 Ibid., 14 and 459.
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preventing mob outbreaks, sheriffs’ refusal to request the Guard’s aid rendered such 
outside intervention typically futile. He concluded that a state would have to exercise 
more power over its counties in order to stem the tide of lynchings, for the local 
representative—the county sheriff—was inhibited by the power of the ballot.42
In addition to the Southern Commission, Alexander formed an interrelated 
Commission of Law School Deans to study the legal aspects of lynching. Building and 
expanding upon Raper’s work, James Chadboum, a law professor at the University of 
North Carolina, published Lynching and the Law in 1933. As well as suggesting “model 
ouster laws” which could function as an important anti-lynching device by punishing 
sheriffs and other law enforcement officials who condoned or participated in mob 
violence, Chadboum analyzed the failure of the current anti-lynching statutes to operate 
effectively, if  at all. Noting that improved ouster laws were a necessity if lynching was to 
be eradicated, he quoted a finding of Raper’s: ‘“ Do you think I’m going to risk my life 
protecting a nigger?”’ was a “representative attitude of peace officers in some of the 1930 
cases.” In the “majority” of these instances, the “mob took possession of the accused in 
the presence of the officer, who did not fire a shot or make any other real effort to protect 
the accused.”43
While nine states had made provisions for the removal of peace officers who 
failed to prevent lynchings, Chadboum noted that since the creation of these statutes in 
the early 1900s, not one peace officer had been convicted or ousted because of a
42 Ibid., 14-16.
43 Chadboum, 69-70.
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lynching, owing in part to grand and petit jury inaction, as well as the reluctance of 
community members to testify against their sheriff. In addition to these latter two 
reasons, however, Chadboum criticized the statutes for ignoring a critical issue. They 
stated that the person killed or injured must be in the custody of the officer, but none of 
them removed an officer in cases where he did not have custody of a prisoner but was 
still negligent. Chadboum argued that this might encourage peace officers to fail to arrest 
a person threatened with mob violence so that the ouster penalty could be avoided. To 
illustrate this point, and the Southern Commission’s similar argument that in several 1930 
cases mob victims were “without benefit of the sheriff,” Chadboum described a few 
southern incidents in which the sheriff, “once he found that the accused Negro was 
certain of being caught, returned to his office, quite content with the way the things were 
being handled. In two other plantation counties—Brazos, Texas, and Sumter, Alabama— 
the officers deliberately left matters in the hands of the local people.”44
If the Southern Commission and its sociologists sought to publicize lynching 
statistics and analyze the social origins of extralegal racial violence, the Association of 
Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching chose a more community-based, activist 
approach. On November 1, 1930, a group of twenty-six white women from six southern 
states formed the ASWPL. Their goal was to break the tie between the tradition of 
chivalry and lynching by using the moral and social influence of a group of organized 
southern white women—the very women that the white patriarchy yearned to protect.
More broadly, it hoped to mobilize white southern anti-lynching opinion. The ASWPL 
neither addressed the issue of federal anti-lynching legislation nor problems of
44 Ibid., 71.
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discrimination and civil rights, choosing to confine its efforts to the direct eradication of 
lynching. That is, since the anti-lynching statutes that already existed were either legally 
inadequate or simply ignored by southern juries and lynch mobs, the ASWPL decided to 
approach the issue by forgoing the pursuit of traditionally ineffective “paper laws,” and 
instead targeting one of the immediate sources of the lynching problem. The southern 
sheriff, as a “guardian of the law,” was responsible for handling any mob forming in his 
county. Aware that sheriffs “were often a complacent part of mobs,” rarely risking their 
lives to protect black prisoners, members of the ASWPL avoided the halls of Congress 
and instead approached their local sheriffs office.45
It required extraordinary commitment for an association member to carry the anti- 
lynching message into her sheriffs office. Although some members viewed the southern 
sheriff as the “half-drunk” representative of a courthouse gang whose violent means of 
law and order repulsed a southern lady’s idea of friendship, he could just as easily be a 
relative or friend 46 But such neighborly relations were what fueled the ASWPL’s 
program. Because many sheriffs adhered to the public’s racial opinion, the Association’s 
focus on law enforcement was designed to subject sheriffs to powerful demands from 
their community that they uphold the law, not the mob. ASWPL members were in a 
perfect position to spearhead this plan, for their middle to upper class status guaranteed 
that they, their husbands, and relatives could exert pressure on their local sheriffs without 
risk of reprisal. The Association reasoned that if  a large number of respectable and
45 Mrs. William J. Neel to the sheriffs of Georgia, January 12, 1933, ASWPL Papers, 5:457, 4:1716. For 
a brief discussion of the ASWPL’s involvement with sheriffs’ offices, see Chapter 8 of Hall, Revolt Against 
Chivalry.
46 Jessie Daniel Ames, “Southern Women Look at Lynching,” ASWPL Papers, 4:1837.
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influential local citizens wanted every possible precaution taken to insure a constitutional 
trial for the accused, then most likely the sheriff would reconsider the lessons of southern 
extralegal tradition.47
Of course, the ASWPL knew that it was not just their votes that could affect the 
actions of a sheriff but the votes of citizens outside the association. As the “agent of his 
people,” the sheriff would respond to the “emotional demands of his supporters.” He 
would “judge accurately the number of votes involved” and then work to prevent a 
lynching “in accordance with the desires of the majority.” The office of sheriff was 
subject to little interference from state or federal authorities, but local voters held the 
power of the ballot. Therefore, if he received the “moral support” o f his constituents and 
realized that the expectations of his role had changed, then he could “do more to stop 
lynching than any other one factor.”48
To begin the campaign, practically every member of the ASWPL went to her 
local sheriff, asking him to sign a pledge stating that he would “use every means” to 
“create a public opinion” that would endorse those sheriffs “determined to protect the 
Nation from mob violence” and to eradicate lynching, “a crime which should not be 
tolerated in any civilized country.” Each member of the ASWPL also urged her fellow 
citizens to use the ballot to “see that only those persons who honor the law and hold their 
oath of office inviolate” be permitted to hold the office of sheriff. Furthermore, the 
ASWPL reminded, as voters, citizens could “compel the protection of the community
47 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1975), 225.
48 ASWPL Papers, 4:1792; 4:57; “more than any one factor”: Quoted in Hall, 224.
against the lawlessness of a lynching” by “demanding” that the sheriff either remove a 
prisoner to another county for safekeeping, swear in additional deputies, or request the 
protection of state troops.49
Once ASWPL members received this community backing, they presented sheriffs 
with petitions from their local constituents as evidence of the support they would receive 
for adhering to their oath of office, and conversely, the opposition they would encounter 
if  they condoned extralegal measures. In addition to preventing lynching between 
outbursts of violence, the ASWPL also attempted to prevent them when there was a 
threat of a mob, or even once one had already formed, by having their husbands, friends, 
local ministers, other citizens, and even sometimes the governor, call the sheriff and urge 
him to prevent mob action.50
Believing that positive reinforcement would only improve sheriffs’ confidence in 
their community’s support, the ASWPL kept extensive “signature records,” published 
pamphlets that included names of those sheriffs whose “quick action” deserved ’’special 
mention,” and sent a letter to sheriffs who had reduced lynching rates in their counties, 
thanking them for their “display of courage, cool judgment, and determination.” 
However, for those sheriffs who remained oblivious to persuasion, the ASWPL began a 
negative publicity campaign, publishing names of those who failed to perform their legal 
duty and detailing accounts of their complicity in the death of a black prisoner. A 1937 
bulletin asked, “‘Where were the peace officers?’ All eight victims of lynchings in 1937
49 ASWPL Papers, 4:1756; 4:2003; 5:15; Jessie Daniel Ames, “Southern Women and Lynching,” 
ASWPL Papers, 4:1791.
50 Lewis T. Nordyke, “Ladies and Lynchings,” Survey Graphic 28 (Nov. 1939): 683-86.
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were in the hands of peace officers. In seven of the lynchings, investigations indicate, 
officers were either in the mob or were in collusion with the mob.” Each story revealed 
how easily the mobs could have been thwarted and how quickly the sheriffs surrendered 
to the angry crowd. In several cases, the sheriffs claimed to have been “overpowered.” 
Some denied that a lynching had even occurred: ’’There wasn’t any lynching. There were 
just six or eight men going about their business.” Others openly admitted their refusal to 
defy their white constituency: “I do not call the citizens who executed the Negroes a mob. 
I consider their action an expression of the will of the people.” Through investigations of 
lynchings and prevented lynchings, the ASWPL had argued from the onset of their 
campaign that sheriffs could safeguard prisoners if they wished. As Ames had surmised, 
the common claim of being “overpowered,” for example, was based on political 
expediency, not fear o f bodily harm.51
By 1941, 1,355 peace officers had signed the ASWPL pledges, and the 
organization could report that in one year alone, forty peace officers, many of whom had 
signed ASWPL pledges, had protected their prisoners from mob violence. In 1968, 
sociologist John Shelton Reed conducted an “evaluation” of the ASWPL, concluding that 
it was particularly effective in preventing lynchings in which mobs took prisoners from 
the custody of law officers, for in counties where the association had made its presence 
strongly felt, a dramatic decrease in such crimes had occurred.52 While Ames would not 
have claimed that these improved numbers were due to the ASWPL’s efforts alone,
51 ASWPL Papers, 4:55; 4:1749; 4:1881; 4:1995; 5:457; “Lynching is Wholesale Murder,” ASWPL 
Papers, 4:1861.
52 John Shelton Reed, “An Evaluation of an Anti-Lynching Organization,” Social Problems 16 (Fall 
1968): 172-82.
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Reed’s study proved that the ASWPL program was indeed able to affect the actions of 
sheriffs and create a climate of disapproval that deterred potential lynchers.
The ASWPL’s ability to achieve success in their anti-lynching campaign 
illustrates that the white South was not a monolithic wall of resistance, but rather 
represented a spectrum of opinions regarding race relations in the South. As Martin 
Luther King would argue twenty years after the ASWPL’s campaign, there were three 
kinds of white people in the South: extreme segregationists, moderates, and a tiny 
minority of vocal anti-segregationists. The ASWPL reached the moderates—those whites 
who quietly disapproved of, or were at least embarrassed by, the behavior of the violent 
mobs and sheriffs.
Certainly, these “middle-roaders” were not outspoken in their opposition to 
extralegal racial violence like Will Alexander or Jessie Daniel Ames. Indeed, few white 
southerners were. But, when handed an anti-lynching petition, for example, moderates 
could offer their support without ever having to approach a neighbor’s door or a sheriffs 
office. As historian David Chappell argues, those who represented the middle of the 
spectrum—neither the segregationists nor the activists—did not “stuck their necks out,” 
but instead quietly acted in order to restore social peace, a good business climate, or their 
town’s reputation.53
Ida B. Wells, the CIC, and the Southern Commission gave voice to the problem of 
southern racial violence, and the ASWPL further expanded the anti-lynching campaign 
by reaching into their communities and giving voice to an otherwise silent group of
53 David Chappell, Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1994), xv-xxiv.
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dissenters. However, while organizations like the ASWPL and sociologists like Arthur 
Raper had begun to raise the white public’s awareness of southern racial violence and 
southern sheriffs acquiescence in it, the Civil Rights Movement demonstrated that 
awareness did not necessarily prompt change. As discussed in the next chapter, the battle 
for voting rights in two small Deep South towns required the intervention of the federal 
government to erase the color line that the sheriffs had so carefully drawn.
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PART III
SHERIFF LAWRENCE RAINEY AND SHERIFF JIM CLARK: THE BATTLE FOR 
VOTING RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI AND ALABAMA
“It is more than a coincidence that the only prisoners who are consistently coming out of 
jail with bruises and black eyes are civil rights activists. This isn’t law. It is sadism hiding 
behind a badge.”
Southern Regional Council, 1964
“Deep South sheriffs are usually big men, often running to fat. This one weighs over 240 
pounds and is developing a paunch.”
New York Times ’ description of Sheriff Lawrence Rainey, 1964
“With great clarity Bird saw the dark ring of sweat around the band of the sheriffs 
Stetson, the white-knuckled grip of his hands about the billy club. The sheriff flicked 
away a drop of sweat that ran down his temple; a pulse throbbed in the protruding vein of 
his forehead.”
Go, Go, Said the Bird, Fictional account of Selma by Anne Nell Stallworth, 1984
One night in July 1962, Claude Sitton, a New York Times reporter who often 
covered the Civil Rights Movement in the South, visited a small black church in Terrell 
County, Georgia, where local residents and SNCC workers had gathered for a voting 
rights meeting. Sitton’s past experience suggested that the meeting would not proceed 
without interruption from local law enforcement. His intuition proved correct. Sheriff 
Zeke Mathews entered the church and commandeered the pulpit, announcing that “quite 
enough” of Terrell’s black residents—51 out of 8,209—were already registered to vote. 
As one of Mathews’ deputies fingered his revolver and another slapped a five-cell
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flashlight in the palm of his hand, Mathews blatantly acknowledged his refusal to 
recognize the goals of the Movement, declaring, “We want our colored people to go on 
living like they have for the last hundred years.” Sitton later left the church to find his car 
tire slashed and sand in the gas tank. His vivid, front-page account outraged readers, 
including President John F. Kennedy and his attorney general and brother, Robert. In less 
than two weeks after Sitton’s story appeared in the Times, Justice Department lawyers 
and FBI agents descended on Terrell County and filed a voting rights complaint against 
Sheriff Mathews.54
Stories like Sitton’s were valuable in educating the country and federal 
government officials on the challenges that civil rights workers and blacks faced in the 
South. By 1960, lynching had disappeared almost entirely from the southern landscape, 
but the southern values and attitudes that had given rise to it had not. By playing a central 
role in thwarting African Americans' attempts at desegregation and acquisition of the 
ballot, some southern sheriffs continued to impose the racial caste system. For example, 
in February 1963, Ruby Hurley, the NAACP's Southeast Regional Secretary, wrote a 
letter to Michigan Congressman John Dingell, Jr. (D) that surveyed black southerners’ 
continuing problems with segregated transportation. She reported that in Inverness, 
Florida, both Greyhound and Trail ways used a Standard Oil gas station as their bus 
station. Near the passenger boarding area, signs approximately two feet high were boldly 
lettered "White Only" and "cannot be missed by anyone.” Hurley learned that the sheriff 
“makes himself conspicuous on schedule with the buses," for he knew that his mere
54 Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1988), 619-20.
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presence would keep blacks from boarding.55 As they had done for over a century, 
southern sheriffs continued to defend the racist views of their white constituency and to 
deny the black community protection and equality.
As the findings of two sociologists who conducted a 1967 study of the southern 
sheriffs office show, in some communities, expectations of the sheriff had not changed, 
either. Dana Brammer and James Hurley observed that although state constitutions and 
statutes served as the primary determinant of the office's responsibilities, "to a great 
extent" sheriffs responded not just to the statutes but to custom and environmental 
conditions. That is, the ability of the sheriff to handle the pressures and complaints 
brought by his local citizenry still played a large part in determining his success or failure 
in office. Brammer and Hurley's conclusions barely differed from those of earlier 
sociologists like Arthur Raper because the nature of the citizens’ complaints had not 
changed. Race-related issues remained in the forefront of the southern mind, and the fear 
o f black equality persisted. The Civil Rights Movement only heightened this fear, 
especially in the rural, small-town South.56
The conclusions of the federal government and the Southern Regional Council 
(SRC) echoed those of Brammer and Hurley and the NAACP. The SRC observed that the 
cooperation of law enforcement authorities in civil rights violence was due to the 
“climate of opinion” which tolerated and encouraged the “brute.” Likewise, the 
Commission on Civil Rights knew that the most "crucial factor" in maintaining law and
55 Letter from Ruby Hurley to Dingell, NAACP Papers, Series B, Part 25, 4:814.
56 Dana Brammer and James Hurley, A Study o f the Office o f Sheriff in the United States, Southern 
Region, 1967 (University of Mississippi: Bureau of Governmental Research, 1968): 27.
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order in a community gripped by racial crisis was the support of state and local law 
enforcement officers. However, in a region often frustrated and angered by black pursuit 
of equality, "support’' was color-biased. In its 1965 Law Enforcement Report, the 
Commission concluded that local law enforcement "failed to protect Negroes and civil 
rights workers from violence, interfered with the exercise of Federal rights . . .  and 
abused their discretion in the administration of justice." Furthermore, they found 
extensive evidence of Klan connections with local sheriffs and deputies.57
Nowhere was this more evident than in Neshoba County, Mississippi, and Dallas 
County, Alabama. During the mid-1960s, these two Deep South states became the targets 
of the civil rights movement's growing emphasis on the registration of black voters. 
Unlike the sheriff mentioned in Ruby Hurley's letter, the sheriffs governing these 
counties made it past the archives of the NAACP and onto national newspaper headlines. 
When three civil rights workers—Michael Schwemer, Andrew Goodman, and James 
Chaney—were murdered in the Neshoba County seat of Philadelphia in the summer of 
1964, the subsequent FBI investigation revealed that Sheriff Lawrence Rainey's office 
was linked to several other incidents of racial violence. In the neighboring state to the 
east, demonstrators in Selma suffered under the club-wielding hand of Sheriff Jim Clark, 
who was determined to deny the ballot to the black community. Clark and Rainey's 
similar physical descriptions became recognized throughout America. Journalists often 
introduced the sheriffs into news stories by noting their weight, and adjectives like
57 “Law Enforcement in Mississippi” (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1964): 19; Michael Belknap, 
Civil Rights, the White House, and the Justice Department, 1945-1968: Racial Violence and Law 
Enforcement in the South (New York: Garland, 1991): 308 and 475.
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"burly,” "beefy," and "bear-shaped" frequently preceded their names, as though their
f  o
large size could help explain the racist actions they supported and inflicted.
Undoubtedly, too, such descriptions made them seem especially threatening to readers, 
heightening the nation’s concern regarding race relations in the South.
When national attention focused on these small southern towns, outsiders 
shuddered at the racism evident in some of the South's law enforcement officials. The 
majority of white citizens in Philadelphia and Selma, however, attempted to defend their 
southern way of life and their sheriffs. They found themselves in an unwelcome spotlight, 
and their reaction to it illustrates that the passage of decades had not changed white racial 
attitudes, the prominent status of the sheriffs office, or the support and protection that 
this powerful elected official received from his community and other local officials, 
especially in the Deep South. Furthermore, both Rainey and Clark appeared confident 
that their position protected them against punishment from the federal government. Like 
Sheriff Shipp in his jail cell over fifty years earlier, Rainey displayed casual ease and 
confidence throughout the months of indictments and arrests, while Clark simply refused 
to keep his billy club idle, responding to every court order with another display of 
violence. Clark and Rainey knew that no white man in the state, especially the man in 
charge of "keeping Negroes in their place" would ever be punished for mistreating 
blacks, even if in Rainey's case, that mistreatment included condoning murder.
Noting the deaths of the three civil rights workers who were murdered in 
Mississippi and three victims of opposition to voting rights activity in Selma, the NAACP
58 Gay Talese, “Burly Sheriff Clark,” New York Times, 16 March 1965, p. 32; Newsweek, 25 Jan. 1965, 
p. 29; New York Times, 5 Dec. 1964, p.l.
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succinctly and pointedly wrote: "These events demonstrate that some white southerners 
have a license to murder, a license too frequently issued to them by southern police 
officers who refuse to vigorously investigate and apprehend, by southern public 
prosecutors who sabotage their cases, by southern judges who are openly biased, and by 
southern juries who refuse to convict."59 The NAACP was undoubtedly referencing, too, 
that the judicial process in the South was often marked by efficiency rather than fairness. 
That is, especially in black capital cases, the threat of white violence provided little 
opportunity for adequate pre-trial preparation, even with the most conscientious of 
counsel, and put juries under tremendous pressure to deliberate quickly, if  at all.60 The 
NAACP’s words also capture the vulnerability of civil rights workers in the South, and 
the domino effect that occurred when civil rights cases arose. Most importantly, however, 
the quote illustrates the southern sheriffs central role in the chain of events. He was the 
first to topple the dominoes -- the first to issue license for racial violence and inequality.
59 “An Open Letter to President Johnson,” NAACP Papers, Part 24, 17:649. The letter was not signed by 
any particular member of the NAACP.
60 Neil McMillen, Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age o f Jim Crow (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1989). See Chapter, “Jim Crow’s Courts.”
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As Sheriff Lawrence Rainey often said, “It’s always better to stop something 
before it happens instead of waiting till after it happens.”61 For Rainey, that “something” 
was the steady arrival of civil rights workers in Philadelphia, Mississippi. After the 
disappearance of Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman, the nation soon discovered that 
Rainey was a man of his word. He believed that his sheriffs uniform had “a lot to do 
with” the work required by the office, and certainly, his appearance suggested that he 
took his job seriously. At six feet two inches and 240 pounds, Rainey was a formidable 
figure. The belt line of his khaki uniform bulged with polished leather, burnished brass 
and lead ammunition, and a heavy holstered gun. Easily recognizable with his calf-length 
boots, a cattleman's hat turned up on the sides atop a balding head, and a fist-sized chaw 
of tobacco in his jaw, he roamed about town in his big gray Oldsmobile equipped with 
the trappings of his office—a siren, red light, loudspeaker, armament, gilt-lettered doors, 
and extra cartons of Red Man.
In August of 1963, when Rainey ran for sheriff, Congress was working on passing a 
national civil rights bill. In an advertisement in the Neshoba (MI) Democrat, Rainey 
wrote, "I believe in our Southern way of life and will strive to keep it that way." Another 
advertisement blared these words in large print: "Vote for Lawrence Rainey, the Man 
who can cope with situations that may arise." Rainey appeared at meetings all over the 
county, and with one hand on his hip holster and the other rolling his wide-brimmed hat,
61 Reese Cleghom, “The Two Faces of Sheriff Rainey,” New York Times Magazine, 21 Feb. 1965, p. 10.
62 Several sources provide detailed descriptions of Rainey’s physical appearance: Don Whitehead, Attack 
on Terror: The FBI Against the Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970), 37; 
William Bradford Huie, “The Untold Story of the Mississippi Murders,” Saturday Evening Post 237 (Sept. 
5, 1964); David Nevin, “A Strange, Tight Little Town, Loath to Admit Complicity,” Life 57 (Dec, 18,
1964): 38-9.
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he would say, "If you elect me, I'll take care of things for you." Locals knew to which 
"situations" and "things" he was referring, for Mississippi’s race problem was an 
overwhelming concern, and Rainey's record as a police patrolman and a deputy sheriff in 
Philadelphia was, in the eyes of his white public, impressive. He had killed two blacks, 
and the African American community openly feared him. Furthermore, Rainey had been 
bom and raised on a farm in adjoining Kemper County by "law-abiding" parents who 
taught him to "obey the laws of the land." For white Philadelphians, Rainey’s record and 
his southern heritage made him the perfect candidate. Confident that he would control the 
black population, an absolute requirement for a Mississippi law enforcement official,
/TO
Rainey’s white constituents elected him by a handsome majority.
With the slogan “Crack Mississippi and you can crack the South,” civil rights 
workers in 1962 made Mississippi the primary target of the Movement's growing 
emphasis on the registration of black voters. In order to unify the efforts o f all civil rights 
groups working in Mississippi, members of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), and the NAACP created the Council of Federated Organizations 
(COFO) in 1963. During the “Freedom Summer” of 1964, COFO mobilized hundreds of 
young volunteers, including nearly nine hundred white college students from outside the 
state, to establish "freedom schools," organize black community centers, and press for 
voter registrations that would give the state's four hundred thousand voting-age blacks 
greater political leverage. But if COFO was determined to break Mississippi's traditional
63 Ads quoted in Cleghom, 68-9; William Bradford Huie, “The Untold Story of the Mississippi 
Murders,” Saturday Evening Post 237 (Sept. 5, 1964); David Nevin, “A Strange, Tight Little Town, Loath 
to Admit Complicity,” Life 57 (Dec. 18, 1964): 38-9.
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racial customs, a revived Ku Klux Klan and thousands of other Mississippians were 
determined to fight these “young busybodies” who were challenging white supremacy.
As a report from the Southern Regional Council noted, the Freedom Summer project 
“aroused fears comparable to the ancient terror of a slave uprising.” Therefore, many in 
the white community echoed the sentiment of an editorial in the Neshoba Democrat. 
“Outsiders who come in here and try to stir up trouble should be dealt with in a manner 
they won’t forget.” They adhered to the philosophy that “when the Negro is subdued, 
there is peace” and looked to their local law enforcement officers to keep the black 
population “restrained.”64
In April 1964, two months before the COFO workers arrived, the KKK planted 
a burning cross in the courthouse square, the geographical center of Philadelphia. No 
local citizens quenched the flames or tore it down, and no law enforcement officer would 
admit to having seen the cross placed in the square. Local newspapers noted that Sheriff 
Rainey was investigating, but nothing came of the investigation. Inside the courthouse, a 
poster, noting twenty reasons why one should "join, aid and support" the Klan of 
Mississippi, was tacked to the bulletin board in the lobby, not far from Rainey's office. 
The poster remained there for several days.65
As the Klan gathered and talked of destroying the northern outsiders, the 
"communist-led invaders" who wanted to place too much social, political, and economic 
power into the hands of the black population, the leaders of the Mississippi Summer
64 “Crack MI”: Richard Woodley, “A Recollection of Michael Schwemer,” The Reporter (July 16,
1964): 24. Dallas Morning News, 21 June 1964, p. 2; “Law Enforcement in Mississippi” (Southern 
Regional Council: Atlanta, 1964): 29-30; Neshoba Democrat, 9 April 1964, p. 1.
65 Whitehead, 26.
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Project informed their audience of civil rights volunteers that death was a possibility, and 
expectations of constitutional rights an impossibility. SNCC leader Robert Moses told 
them, "Everything the white power structure does in Mississippi is unconstitutional." At 
the head of the white power structure was Sheriff Rainey, and as one magazine editorial 
commented, in the land of Mississippi, the sheriff interpreted the Constitution to favor the 
racial status quo, not paper laws, and amended the Bill of Rights at will.66
Furthermore, Moses could have added, expectations of protection from the federal 
government were also unrealistic. Recent history had demonstrated as much. In 1959, 
Rainey, then a city policeman, shot an innocent black man. When a coroner’s jury ruled 
that the killing was justifiable homicide, Medgar Evers, then Mississippi Field Secretary 
for the NAACP, asked the U.S. Attorney General, William Rogers, to investigate further. 
Although Rogers promised Evers that the matter would receive “careful consideration,” 
within less than a month the Justice Department concluded that no “violation of any 
federal statute” had occurred and that there was no “basis for any action by this 
department.”67 Whether aware of this particular story or not, parents and relatives of 
Freedom Summer participants wrote President Johnson, noting the “breakdown” of 
Mississippi state protection and urging him to send federal police forces to prevent “any 
tragic occurrence” in a region known as the “toughest” in its handling of race relations. 
Echoing their concerns, Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall reported to Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy that “law enforcement officials in Mississippi are widely
66 Moses quoted in Louis Lomax, “The Road to Mississippi,” Ramparts special edition, 1964; 
Commonweal 80 (Aug. 21, 1964): 562.
67 Myrlie B. Evers, For Us the Living (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1967), 212-13.
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believed to be linked to anti-Negro activity, or at the very least to tolerate it.” Roy 
Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, also informed the Attorney General that 
only the employment of federal troops could guarantee a measure of protection for both 
the rights workers and the black population.68
Yet despite these warnings and requests, Kennedy, like his predecessor, deemed 
federal intervention a violation of the federal-state relationship. That is, he believed that it 
was Mississippi’s responsibility to protect its citizens, and vigorous local law 
enforcement should have been able to cope with any foreseeable problems caused by the 
Freedom Summer. However, because Rainey had chosen to cope with the “problems” 
through repression rather than protection, the idea that local law enforcement was 
equipped to handle the influx of rights workers was only theoretically accurate. As the 
Atlanta Constitution editorialized after the discovery of the bodies o f Goodman, Cheney, 
and Schwemer, while federal administration of a state was generally an “absurd” idea, in 
areas like Neshoba County where local law enforcement officers participated in, or at 
least ignored, the murder of three civil rights workers, federal intervention was not only 
desirable, but necessary.69
In June 1964, summer volunteer Andrew Goodman joined CORE staffers Chaney 
and Schwemer, who had been working in the state for several months, in their voter 
registration efforts. After spending the afternoon visiting the site of a local black church 
that had burned to the ground and passing out leaflets urging members of a nearby black 
church to attend voter registration schools, the three workers were pulled over by Deputy
68 Belknap, 330 and 244; New York Times, 25 June 1964, p. 1.
69 Atlanta Constitution, 15 July 1964, p. 4.
53
Sheriff Cecil Price. He took them to the Philadelphia jail, charging Chaney with speeding 
and holding the other two on suspicion of arson. That evening, Price released the three, 
and they headed out of Philadelphia toward Meridian, their home base for the summer.
As newspapers across the nation reported less than forty-eight hours later, the young men 
never made it to their destination. In the long investigation that ensued, the FBI would 
discover that a mob composed of Klan members and other local citizens brutally attacked 
and murdered the three, and that the sheriffs office played a concealed but pivotal role in 
the crime.
Price became the central figure in the investigation, for he had alerted the mob 
that the men had left the jail. At the time of the lynching, Sheriff Rainey had been visiting 
his wife in the hospital. However, while he had not witnessed or participated in the 
murder, Rainey was likely aware of at least one of the three rights workers' impending 
death. The Klan had begun planning Schwemer’s “elimination” within two months of his 
arrival in Mississippi in January 1964, and Klan members had not only elected Rainey to 
office, they were his friends. He had made it clear during his campaign that racial issues 
would be his main priority; thus he would acquiesce to racial violence, especially when a 
civil rights-backed "summer project" demanded a fierce reminder of white power. The 
FBI named Rainey a conspirator in the crime, a quiet accomplice who fulfilled his 
promise of racial control.
A week after the workers' disappearance, President Johnson sent the FBI into the 
piney woods and pastures of Neshoba County. One local resident approached an agent, 
and when no one else was near, whispered, "I think if I were in your place, I'd start with 
the sheriffs office." The FBI quickly discovered, however, that such a tip was a rarity,
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and that silence was the more typical reaction of local citizens. As one journalist 
observed, "to speak out against the Klan or even to question Lawrence Rainey's treatment 
of Negroes has come to be equated somehow with disloyalty to one's own." That is, 
conformity to the racial status quo and uniformity of attitude were part of the southern 
way of life, most notably in rural areas like Neshoba County. A field report from the 
Southern Regional Council supported this journalist's observation, noting that "in 
Mississippi, 'law enforcement' means control of Negroes. Protection of Negroes and 
restraint of their white attackers is not included in the concept. . . The anti-Negro ruffian 
is protected by the concealment of woods and swamps, by the sympathy of many of his 
neighbors, and by a paralysis of law enforcement." FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover echoed 
the SRC’s words, noting that “around Philadelphia, law enforcement is practically nil and
70many time sheriffs and deputies participate in the crime.”
The "anti-Negro ruffian" also received the sympathy and support of local 
government officials. Governor Paul Johnson said he was "satisfied" that everything was 
being done to locate the missing workers, even though the national government, not 
Mississippi, was conducting the search. Johnson denied that such a disappearance was 
unique to Mississippi, or a reflection of the state's racist climate. He told newsmen that 
the disappearance was something that "could happen anytime" in any part of the country, 
adding that "it happens in New York every night." He boasted that Mississippi had the 
lowest crime rate in the nation, but failed to mention that when whites committed crimes 
against blacks, they were rarely arrested, brought to trial, or convicted. The civil rights
70 Whitehead, 82; Nevin, 39; “Law Enforcement in Mississippi,” 31; New York Times, 28 Nov. 1964.
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movement spawned much anti-black violence—nineteen church burnings, fifty beatings 
of blacks by whites, eleven black deaths that were almost certainly lynchings—but these
• 71crimes did not even make it onto a police blotter.
The journalists, cameramen, and FBI agents who descended upon 
Philadelphia in the days after the disappearance encountered the wrath of Rainey’s loyal 
followers, who denied that a lynching had occurred. When eight northern reporters tried 
to question Rainey about the missing men, an angry crowd chased them from the 
courthouse. Philadelphia citizens stoutly defended the idea that the civil rights workers 
were not missing, but had purposely staged their own disappearance in an effort to bring 
bad publicity to Mississippi. As the Delta Democrat-Times editorialized, "the general 
feeling among people is that they are not concerned whether the men are ever found. A 
feeling of'let it be a lesson' is evident." Rainey echoed their opinion, telling reporters that 
the workers were just "hiding and trying to cause a lot of bad publicity” for the state. He 
told the FBI that the sheriffs office did not have any knowledge of the Klan's existence in 
Neshoba County, and though he boasted during his campaign that he had killed two black 
men in his custody, he informed the FBI that he had never mistreated a prisoner. In 
addition, despite the fact that the Klan had distributed pictures of Schwemer months 
before his arrival in the county, Rainey said that he did not recognize any of the faces of 
the missing men.72
Over a month after the workers’ disappearance, a Klan member secretly revealed 
to the FBI that he knew where Chaney, Goodman, and Schwemer were buried. Once the
71 Meridian Star, 26 June 1964, p. 1.
72 Delta Democrat-Times, 29 June 1964, p. 4; Time 84 (July 3, 1964): 4.
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bodies were unearthed, Rainey refused to speak to the FBI unless they had a warrant. 
According to New York Times reporter Reese Cleghom, the news did not surprise the 
black community, but the majority of white Philadelphians did not believe, or at least 
refused to publicly acknowledge, that the men had been murdered. After speaking with 
both black and white residents of Neshoba County, Cleghom observed that Sheriff 
Rainey had "two faces." In the eyes of the white community, he was a "likable fellow," "a 
fine man," and the "most cooperative" of any county sheriff. Some of Philadelphia's most 
prominent citizens testified to the national press about Rainey's sterling and generous 
character. Jack Tannehill, editor of the Neshoba Democrat, noted that when Rainey saw 
"a drunk nigger on the street, instead of just grabbing him, Lawrence will say, 'Now boy, 
you get on home now 'fore I have to run you in.' That's the kind of man Lawrence Rainey 
is." A Philadelphia banker related another incident illustrating what he viewed as 
Rainey's compassion: "This nigger woman was trying to cash a forged check. I told the 
teller to call for the sheriff. The nigger woman snatched the check and started to run. The 
sheriff caught up with her at the comer. She resisted and was slamming him up against a 
building when I arrived. I don't believe in police brutality, but I told the sheriff, "Take 
that club and knock the hell out of her.' He didn't do it."73
Just as Rainey and his fellow Philadelphians agreed that the three civil rights 
workers had faked their disappearance, the citizens’ comments again demonstrate the 
nature of race relations in this small Mississippi town and the common bond that existed 
between a sheriff and his white community. In terms of their sheriffs character, whites
73 Nevin, 39.
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saw only what they wanted to see, and blacks saw the worst. For the black community, 
Rainey’s face inspired fear and hatred, not respect and praise. As white mouths closed in 
shock, refusing to believe that such a violent crime had occurred, the recovery of the 
bodies prompted the formerly silent black community to speak about the brutality o f the 
sheriffs office in Neshoba County. One black man, Wilmer Jones, noted that Rainey 
arrested him on suspicion of asking a white female store clerk for a date. Rainey and 
Price repeatedly slapped him in his cell and cut off his goatee with a pocketknife. They 
released him several hours later to four Klansmen who were waiting outside the jail to 
administer further punishment for his “crime.” Other members of the black community 
came forward to describe beatings with the sheriffs blackjack or in one case, a belt from 
a cotton gin machine.74
These stories formed a sordid pattern of law enforcement’s mistreatment of the 
black community and revealed the fear and repression that the black community endured. 
For example, Rainey's mere presence could inspire terror. When the sheriffs car patrolled 
the black neighborhoods at night, some would leave their porches and go quietly inside 
their houses for fear that a glance of the eyes or a shift of the feet could spark the sheriffs 
anger. One night Rainey arrived at the County Fair and stood wide-legged under a light, 
silently and sternly surveying this gathering of over 300 people. Gradually the crowd 
began to disperse until the grounds were empty. Rainey, like some other southern 
sheriffs, took advantage of the power and prestige attributed to his office, and blacks, the
74 Cleghom, 10; Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: 
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usual victims of such power, knew that they were helpless against the sheriff and the 
white community that protected him.
In Mississippi, and throughout the South, blacks believed that the color of their 
skin typically guaranteed guilt, and attempts to prove otherwise were futile. One man told 
agents that Rainey searched him for a gun, and when he denied possessing one, Rainey 
asked, "Nigger, do you know who's running this county? Lawrence A. Rainey is running 
this county." The young man interjected, "I thought the mayor . . . , "  and Rainey replied, 
"Nigger don't come talking about no mayor cause I'm sheriff in this county." Another 
man, whose story was repeated in the national press, told agents that he was deathly 
afraid of Rainey after sustaining a cerebral concussion due to Rainey's repeated blows 
upon his head. As he phrased it, "Rainey would say I was drunk and I would have to say, 
'Yessir, I'm drunk," and he could beat me up again and nothing would be done about it. It
nc
would be a nigger's word against a white sheriff, and what he says goes."
Even the FBI's word against a sheriff seemed incapable o f weakening the sheriffs 
power and prestige. In the months that followed the discovery of the bodies, the FBI first 
charged the Philadelphia sheriffs office with conspiring to and actually depriving six 
black Philadelphians of their constitutional rights while acting under the color o f law and 
twice filed charges related to the murder of the three civil rights workers. Each time, 
Rainey and Price not only received the support of the white community, but that of 
southern officials. In late September 1964, a Mississippi grand jury convened to 
determine if the stories of brutality about which local blacks spoke were true. In his
75 Cleghom, 69; Whitehead, 150; Nevin, 39.
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charge to the jury, Circuit Judge O.H. Barnett, an outspoken segregationist, noted that 
Nesboba County had been "indicted and tried" before the world by "Socialistic-minded 
liberals" who would not wait for the courts^o act. Furthermore, he told the jurors, the 
investigation would have the assistance of "the most courageous sheriff in all America, 
Lawrence Rainey." With these words of an elected Mississippi official ringing in their 
ears, the jury did not bring indictments against Rainey or Price.
However, the FBI moved for federal indictments, and a federal grand jury 
convened. Despite a small card tied to Price's lapel that read, "Regardless of what you see 
or hear about me, I'M INNOCENT," the grand jury found the sheriffs office guilty.
When the FBI arrested Rainey and Price and brought them to the Federal Building in 
downtown Meridian, forty miles west of Philadelphia, they met a cheering crowd of over 
two hundred whites. Other members of the crowd jeered at reporters and shoved 
photographers aside while Rainey and Price, smiling broadly, walked into the building. 
U.S. Commissioner Esther Carter released them on bond. As the sheriff and his deputy
77exited the building, a local bystander muttered, "All that fuss over a few niggers."
During October and November, the FBI continued its investigations of the 
Philadelphia sheriffs office and its involvement with the murders of the three civil rights 
workers. The federal presence in the small eastern Mississippi town angered many of the 
local residents, and the arrest of Rainey, Price, and nineteen Philadelphia citizens further 
prompted the white community's staunch defense of their sheriff and their vision of
76 John Herbers, “Mississippi Calls Jury in Slayings,” New York Times, 23 Sept. 1964, p. 4.
77 Whitehead, 174.
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appropriate law enforcement. Because murder is a state offense, thus rendering the 
Mississippians beyond the jurisdictional reach of the federal government, the complaints 
filed by the FBI charged these men under an 1870 law that, appropriately enough, had 
been passed to control Klan terrorism. The FBI advised Governor Paul Johnson of the 
nature of its evidence in the hope that the state would institute a prosecution of the case 
on murder charges, but the governor and other state officials declined to do so. Jackson 
FBI Chief Roy Moore found Johnson “skittish” about the FBI’s suggestion, which Moore 
attributed to Johnson’s fear of political suicide in bringing a murder charge against the 
popular Sheriff Rainey. Considering that Governor Johnson, in an address to a crowd at 
the Neshoba County Fair in August, shouted that "neither Mississippians nor their state 
and county officers have any obligation to enforce the federal civil rights law," the state's 
refusal to charge local citizens or the sheriffs office with murdering three civil rights 
workers is unsurprising.78
Thus, on December 4, FBI agents arrived at the Neshoba County courthouse to 
arrest Rainey and Price for assisting in what they believed to be a Klan-organized 
conspiracy to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate" Schwemer, Chaney, and 
Goodman. As the agents waited for the officers to return from a "whisky raid" in a nearby 
town, an angry crowd joined them on the courthouse steps. The New York Times reported 
that Rainey paid no attention to the federal agents when he arrived and "strode" into the 
courthouse with a revolver "jouncing on one big hip and a blackjack dangling from the 
other." The crowd shouted insults at the agents as they left with Rainey and Price, and in
78 William Bradford Huie, Three Lives for Mississippi (New York: WCC Books, 1965): 239; Philip 
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an attempt to prevent their town and their sheriff from receiving unwanted national 
publicity, several men grabbed the arms and cameras of photographers. A local resident 
chased a CBS cameraman from the courthouse square, and an Associated Press 
photographer noted that one of the men threatened him with a knife.79
An employee of a local bank, watching from his doorway, told the Times reporter 
that the arrests only proved that "the whole country is taking orders from Martin Luther 
King." Although Philadelphia's white moderate majority expressed relief that the federal 
government had finally ended the suspense over the suspects' identity, and some 
organized a letter-writing campaign to urge Governor Johnson to see that the defendants 
would be fully prosecuted, most residents believed that the FBI simply wanted an easy 
solution to the crime and was looking for a "whipping boy" when it arrested the sheriff, 
his deputy, and several local citizens. As David Nevin, a Life reporter, observed, 
Philadelphia, Mississippi, was a "strange, tight little town, loath to admit complicity," and 
content in its conviction that northerners, outside agitators, provoked the deaths of the 
three civil rights workers. They believed themselves faultless, and as a result, Nevin 
noted, they were "quite unable to feel any collective guilt." Instead, they felt pride in the 
actions of their sheriff and his deputy. The day after his arrest, Price said, "It took me an
O A
hour to get to work this morning. I had to spend so much time shaking hands." 
Obviously, the arrest had not stained the reputation of the sheriffs office, but enhanced it.
79 Homer Bigart, “Sheriff and Deputy Arrested on Return from Whisky Raid,” New York Times, 5 Dec. 
1964, p. 1.
80 Ibid: Delta Democrat-Times, 6 Dec. 1964, p. 2; Nevin, 38-9.
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But if most Neshobans heralded Rainey as a southern folk hero, a lawman who 
ran his county in the traditional fashion, the national press not only expressed shock at the 
nature of southern justice, but mocked the physical characteristics of this man who 
seemed to personify racism. After his arraignment on December 4, Life magazine ran a 
double-page spread of Rainey with a large chew of tobacco in his cheek and a bag of Red 
Man prominently displayed in his lap. He casually rested his bulky weight on his elbows 
and grinned broadly at his co-defendants seated beside him. The Times voiced surprise 
that the "255-pound sheriff showed no sign of being shaken" and after being released on 
bond until a trial date could be determined, returned to his law enforcement duties by that 
afternoon.81 Again, the journalist mentioned Rainey’s weight, as though his large size 
helped explain his stalwart reaction to his arrest. In truth, however, Rainey's confidence 
and unrepentance, like that of the other defendants, grew out of an awareness of local 
white sentiment. In a land where even the governor openly refused to support the goals of 
the civil rights movement, conviction of the sheriff for conspiring to subvert these goals, 
even in such a violent fashion, seemed doubtful.
The black community was aware of local white sentiment as well. A group of 
white lawyers and businessmen organized a statewide defense fund to pay the legal 
expenses of the twenty-one men, which soon surpassed the fund for rebuilding the burned 
Mt. Zion church. And while a meeting of the State Sheriffs Association heralded Rainey 
as a hero, applauding him "to the rafters," the black community expressed fear that the
81 “255 pound”: John Herbers, “Mississippi Bars Rights Trial Now,” New York Times, 6 Dec. 1964, p. 1;
Nevin, 36-7.
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sheriff would be acquitted. Although happy to see Rainey and Price arrested, as one 
woman told a Times reporter, black citizens still feared what would "happen if they let 
the sheriff off."82 They knew that conviction of a white man, much less a sheriff, on civil 
rights charges would be unlikely and held little hope that the Rainey and Price would be 
removed from office.
Martin Luther King, however, hailed the news and praised the FBI “for the work 
they have done in uncovering the perpetrators of this dastardly act.” James Farmer, the 
national director of CORE, echoed King’s approval, but cautioned, “The prosecution 
must now be diligent and vigorous. We want the defendants to have a trial that is fair in 
every regard -  the guilty must be convicted for the sake of justice, not vengeance.” The 
sense of accomplishment, however, proved fleeting. On December 10 the defendants 
gathered in the Meridian courtroom for their preliminary hearing to establish whether 
sufficient evidence existed to hold the accused group for trial. The hearing began with the 
FBI testifying that it had a signed confession from one of the accused who had witnessed 
the killing of the three rights workers. To the surprise of government attorneys, U.S. 
Commissioner for the Southern District of Mississippi Esther Carter refused to allow the 
introduction of the confession, declaring it hearsay evidence because only one FBI agent 
had been present during the interrogation, and dismissed the charges against the men. 
Justice Department attorney Robert Owen argued that a sworn, signed statement 
introduced into a preliminary hearing by a federal agent had never before been 
disallowed, but Carter held firm.
82 Huie, “Three Lives,” 200; John Herbers, “Negroes Anxious on Rights Trial,” New York Times, 9 Dec. 
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A native Mississippian, she seemed to be determined that Rainey and Price would 
not be punished for fulfilling the expectations of the majority of their white constituents, 
and likewise, that the other nineteen men would not be punished for upholding the goals 
of white supremacy. As the New York Times noted, the “dismissal of the Government’s 
civil rights prosecutions in Mississippi demonstrates again the difficulty of enforcing 
Federal criminal law in the Deep South when racial feelings are involved . . . Miss Carter 
is an illustration of the localism inherent even in the federal judicial system,” for she was 
appointed by a regionally and racially biased federal judge in Mississippi, not the more 
neutral Justice Department. When news of the defendants’ release reached those waiting 
outside the courthouse, a black woman fell to the pavement screaming, "Jesus, Jesus, 
no!" But when Rainey left the building, white spectators shook his hand and slapped him 
on the back, and a local policeman said, "OP Rainey could be elected governor now."
The Justice Department repeated Owen’s argument in the courtroom, calling 
Carter's refusal to accept a law officer's report of a signed confession "totally without 
precedent" and immediately called on federal Judge William Harold Cox of the Southern 
District of Mississippi to reconvene the federal grand jury. The national press expressed 
doubt that the Justice Department’s determined pursuit of conviction could ever be 
realized, even with a federal jury, for as the New York Times editorialized, “juries in the 
South, whether Federal or state, generally are reluctant to convict whites in civil rights 
cases.” The Delta Democrat-Times agreed but provided a more vivid description of
83 Carter: New York Times, 11 Dec. 1964, p. 34; “Jesus”: Whitehead, 205; “Ol Rainey”: New York Times, 
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southern jurors and the southern legal system: “The burden upon the grand jurors is not a 
light one. Too many of their fellow white Mississippians will regard them as traitors to 
‘our way of life’ (which in this case means murder) if  they return any indictments.” 
However, on January 15, 1965, a federal grand jury in Jackson charged the group with 
conspiracy to deprive Schwemer, Goodman, and Chaney of their federally secured rights 
and conspiracy to deprive the three of their constitutional rights while "acting under the 
color of law."84
Again, Rainey reacted nonchalantly to his impending arrest. Newsweek noted that
he and the rest of the suspects seemed "neither surprised nor visibly concerned at their
fate before a Mississippi jury." While waiting for Commissioner Carter to issue their
bonds, Rainey and Price chatted and joked with the crowd that had gathered in the federal
building. As they had done before, he and Price returned to their law enforcement duties,
and again, the New York Times expressed shock that neither took a leave of absence: "It
would seem elementary that, until the charges have been passed upon, the indicted sheriff
and his chief deputy would be suspended. In New York, for example, it would be
unthinkable for a patrolman even more a ranking police official to stay at his post while
*
under criminal charges. But that does not seem the way things are done in Neshoba 
County." Instead, Rainey and Price never removed their badges and quickly returned to 
the streets of Philadelphia as the "principal upholders of peace, order, and justice."85
84 New York Times, 13 Dec. 1964; Delta Democrat-Times, 13 Jan. 1965, p. 4.
85 Newsweek 65 (Jan. 25. 1965): 29; New York Times, 18 Jan. 1965, p. 34.
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A month later, Price and Rainey again benefited from the prejudice of a court 
official. Judge Cox dismissed the indictment charging the defendants with conspiring to 
deprive the three rights workers of their federally secured rights on the grounds that the 
federal government had no jurisdiction. He ruled that Price and Rainey would only be 
tried on a misdemeanor count, which carried a maximum penalty of a one year 
imprisonment and a five thousand dollar fine. Cox was known as a segregationist 
unsympathetic to civil rights cases. He had called black voting rights activists "a bunch of 
niggers . . . chimpanzees." On another occasion, he wrote the Justice Department 
complaining about its "lousy" rights cases. On a third occasion, he threatened to jail U.S. 
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach for contempt, for refusing to process peijury 
indictments against two Negro witnesses. Thus, appalled civil rights advocates attributed 
his ruling to Mississippi justice, which rarely punished a white man for the murder of a 
black man. In this case, an unspoken understanding seemed to exist between Cox and the 
sheriffs office, one which stated that conspiring to commit murder would not be 
punished in civil rights cases. Furthermore, such collaboration undoubtedly contributed to 
the common impression—described by journalists, civil rights workers, and federal
government officials alike—that southern sheriffs and other local law enforcement
86officers could escape conviction, even in the face of a murder charge.
The Justice Department appealed Cox’s ruling to the United States Supreme 
Court. Meanwhile, Price and Rainey became Klan celebrities. In the summer of 1965, 
shortly after civil rights workers marched from Philadelphia to the bumed-out Mt. Zion 
Methodist Church in commemoration of the first anniversary of Schwemer, Goodman,
86 “Judge in Rights Case,” New York Times, 26 Feb. 1965, p. 14; Newsweek 65 (March 8, 1965): 25.
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and Chaney’s deaths, the United Klans opened its recruiting campaign with an evening 
rally near Meridian. Over a thousand people attended, including Sheriff Rainey. Wearing 
his uniform and bullet-studded gunbelt, he received a standing ovation as he mounted the 
speakers' platform to make a brief speech. "I'm glad to be here and to see these fine 
people here . . .  I can tell you I met some of the finest people anywhere in the Klan this 
afternoon and tonight." Not quite two weeks later, Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton held 
another meeting in Greenville, Mississippi, and Rainey and Price attended and were 
officially introduced.87
Confident that he stood little chance of being tried, much less convicted, Price 
declared himself a candidate for the office of Neshoba County sheriff. In an 
advertisement in the Neshoba Democrat, Price revealed his intention to follow the law 
enforcement style of Sheriff Rainey, whose four-year term would expire in December 
1967. Price assured voters that "it will be in the future, as it has been in the past, my 
earnest desire to uphold the law, regardless of whether agitators are of national 
prominence or n o t . . .  I think my actions in the past prove that I want our way of life 
upheld whenever it is attacked by outsiders who have no real interest here except to stir 
up trouble."88 Despite the conspiracy charge and the FBI's discovery of rampant civil 
rights violations in the sheriffs office, Price still spoke of "outsiders" and agitators" and 
remained determined to uphold Mississippi's unique definition of law enforcement.
87 Whitehead, 231.
88 Neshoba Democrat, 26 Jan. 1967, p. 1.
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In March 1966, a full year after Cox dismissed the indictments, the United States 
Supreme Court overruled him and reinstated both original indictments. In its opinion in 
United States v. Price, et al., the court found that the defendants had conspired to "injure, 
oppress, threaten, or intimidate" the three rights workers and had thus denied Goodman, 
Schwemer, and Chaney the right to due process as guaranteed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As Justice Abe Fortas concluded, the conspiracy deprived the three young 
men of this fundamental right, for it “involved releasing the victims from jail at night; 
intercepting, assaulting and killing them; and disposing of their bodies. Its purpose was to 
punish the victims summarily.” The Supreme Court also argued that the second 
indictment, which charged that the “private citizens” who “linked hands” with Rainey 
and Price had acted “under the color of law,” was also accurate, for “to act ‘under color’ 
of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a
O Q
willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”
On October 7, 1967, over four years after the disappearance of Schwemer, 
Chaney, and Goodman, the case against the twenty-one men finally came to trial before 
Judge Cox in federal district court in Meridian. Two weeks later, John Doar, head of the 
Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division, made closing arguments for the 
prosecution. He referred to the murder of the rights workers as a “calculated, cold­
blooded plot,” and accused Price of using “the machinery of the law, his office, his 
authority, his badge, his uniform. . . “to take, to hold, to capture and kill.” But he 
tempered these comments by assuring and reminding the jurors that:
89 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
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the federal government is not invading Philadelphia or Neshoba County. . . [but 
rather] these defendants are tried for a crime under federal law in a Mississippi 
city. . .[This case] is important to the government, it is important to the 
defendants, but most of all. . .it’s important to the state of Mississippi. What I say, 
what the other lawyers say here today. . .  will soon be forgotten, but what you 
twelve people do here today will long be remembered.. .
The jury deliberated for a day but was unable to reach a verdict. Judge Cox, 
however, refused to declare a mistrial and ordered the jury to deliberate further. On the 
morning of October 20, the all-white jury convicted seven of the eighteen men of 
participating in a Klan-led conspiracy to murder the three civil rights workers. They 
found Rainey not guilty, but the conviction of Price and six others marked the first 
successful jury conviction of white law enforcement officials and Klansmen for crimes 
against black people or civil rights workers in the history of Mississippi.
One can only speculate as to why the jury returned guilty verdicts. Perhaps Doar, 
by subtly reminding them that the nation would remember the outcome of this trial, 
appealed to the jurors’ concern regarding Mississippi’s reputation. Or his assurances that 
the federal government was not “invading” their town, a fear that he undoubtedly 
capitalized on in his closing argument, made him appear to the jury as less of an “outside 
agitator” and thus more trustworthy. Possibly, however, the jury deserves more credit 
than such analysis of Doar’s diction allows. Perhaps they simply agreed that some of the 
defendants should be held accountable under the letter, rather than the color, of the law. 
As the New York Times stated, the verdict represented "a measure of the quiet revolution
70
that is taking place in southern attitudes—a slow, still faltering but inexorable conversion 
to the concept that a single standard of justice must cover whites and Negroes alike."90
Neither Price nor Rainey again worked in any capacity as law enforcement 
officers. After serving four years in a northern penitentiary, Cecil Price returned to 
Philadelphia in 1974 where he worked various jobs as a surveyor, oil company driver, 
and watchmaker. Rainey attained short-lived employment as a security guard in the 
Meridian Mall. In 1975, the publicity that accompanied a CBS television drama based on 
Don Whitehead’s book, Attack on Terror: The FBI Versus the Ku Klux Klan in 
Mississippi, cost Rainey the job. As he complained to a reporter, the "FBI set out to break 
me of everything I had, then keep me down to where I could never get another start, and 
they done it."91
In the 1980s, Rainey found another security guard position, this time at a 
Mississippi welcome center. The irony is unmistakable: here was one of the most 
infamous figures in Mississippi’s sordid civil rights history manning the state’s official 
welcome center. Ironically, too, Rainey’s boss was a black man, a minister in the 
Meridian area who resigned from the pastorate rather than heed the will of his 
congregation to fire the old white sheriff once linked to the Klan. Rainey now answered 
to a member of the race he had once overpowered, and failed to inspire fear among a 
black congregation who was no longer afraid to voice their anger.
On November 8, 2002, Rainey died of throat and tongue cancer, likely a 
manifestation of the fist-sized chaw of Red Man that descriptions and photographs often
90 New York Times, 22 Oct. 1967, p. 1.
91 Jackson Clarion-Ledger, 16 June 1974, p. 1.
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captured. His death prompted newspapers to retell the story of the Freedom Summer and 
the 1964 murder of the three civil rights workers. Noting that Rainey never expressed 
sympathy for the victims, a reporter for the San Antonio Express News editorialized, “If 
Rainey wasn’t haunted by Chaney, Goodman, and Schwemer in this life, one wonders if 
he’s haunted by them in his afterlife.”92
Rainey’s story is most significant for its illustration of a marked change between 
a southern sheriff and his loyal white followers. They were no longer partners in crime, 
reciprocating protection from punishment. Perhaps they blamed Rainey for the national 
humiliation that the murders and ensuing trials caused, and simply made him the 
scapegoat. Or perhaps, as the New York Times believed, a “quiet revolution” was 
occurring, and the larger white citizenry no longer wished to support a racist sheriff. Just 
as one can only speculate if the jury’s return of guilty verdicts was due to a concern for 
the state’s reputation versus a sincere regard for justice, the precise reason for Rainey’s 
ostracized status is certainly open for analysis. What is clear, however, is that Rainey’s 
role as a swashbuckling sheriff with a nightstick and six-shooters at his side was over. By 
denying him a position in law enforcement, Rainey's constituents gave him the greatest 
punishment that a former sheriff could receive.
92 San Antonio Express News, 16 Nov. 2002, p. IB. Also see Clarion-Ledger, 13 Nov. 2002, p. 11 A, and 
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Sheriff James G. Clark was a tall, beer-bellied man who sported mirrored 
sunglasses and a lapel button proclaiming "Never!” to racial equality. He wore an 
Eisenhower jacket and a military-style, gold-braided cap. A nightstick, pistol, and cattle 
prod swung from the tooled leather belt that girded his 220 pounds. As the New York 
Times observed, “Clark has made a career of keeping Negroes in line.” Abusing his 
important role in Dallas County, Alabama, Clark became a symbol of "white man's law," 
"aggression," and "oppression" to Selma blacks in the early 1960s, for he followed the 
line of white supremacy by meeting the clamor for voting rights and racial equality with 
violence and arrests.93
In February 1963, the Student Nonviolating Coordination Committee (SNCC) 
chose to concentrate its voting rights campaign in the "Black Belt," an area of dark and 
fertile prairie land covering about fifteen counties between the coastal plains and the 
piedmont of northern Alabama, that remained one of the South's major strongholds of 
resistance to the civil rights movement. The name of the region had assumed an 
ethnological meaning as well, for the majority of the people living in the area were the 
dark-skinned descendants of slaves. Like their ancestors, the black population of the mid­
twentieth century Black Belt endured oppression and racism, the remnants o f the Deep 
South's violent history. This area of Alabama was one of the first to call for secession in 
1861 and was the part most ravaged by the war and most embittered by Reconstruction.
93 “Never”: The State (Columbia, SC), 16 March 1965, p. A-6; “Sheriff In Selma,” New York Times, 12 
Feb. 1965, p. 58; “white man’s law”: Alabama Journal, 21 Jan. 1965, p. 6; “aggression”: New York Times, 
20 Jan. 1965, p. 18; “oppression”: John Herbers, “Negro Goals in Selma,” New York Times, 6 Feb. 1965, p. 
10.
73
The feeling of great injury that characterized the South after Reconstruction never 
disappeared here.94
Particularly in Selma, which called itself the "Queen of the Black Belt" and 
served as the stomping grounds for Sheriff Jim Clark, race relations were “trapped in a 
time warp.”95 In the history of white supremacy, Selma was distinguished as the home of 
the first White Citizens’ Council in Alabama, an organization created to promote 
defiance of the Supreme Court’s 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board o f  Education, which 
made “separate but equal” unconstitutional. According to Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference program director Andrew Young, Selma was “an insulated, isolated, hermetic 
southern town . . . that looked like it still belonged to the nineteenth century. It was 
nothing but a bridge and a main street. Large warehouses lined the river, empty reminders 
of the days of King Cotton.” The Confederate flag that flew over the Edmund Pettus 
Bridge—the eastern entrance into Selma—provided further indication that many features 
of the old order of antebellum life still remained.96
Just as past and present seemed inseparable, so too did public and private law 
enforcement. Clark raised a volunteer mounted “posse” of white citizens, which included 
both Selma’s poor whites and its wealthy businessmen and landowners, to lead to racial 
trouble spots around the state. In defense of white supremacy, Clark went to Montgomery 
during the bus boycott and to Tuscaloosa where he backed Governor Wallace’s fight
94 John Herbers, “Black Belt of Alabama is a Stronghold of 19th Century Racism,” New York Times, 14 
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against desegregation at the University of Alabama. Clark and his posse possessed a 
"Gestapo-like control" over the black population. With guns, clubs, and cattle prods in 
hand, the sheriff and his deputized citizenry kept them in perpetual fear. SNCC called 
Selma a "town in a reign of terror." Martin Luther King, Jr. noted that a "carefully 
cultivated mystique" existed behind the power and brutality of Clark and his men, and the 
Alabama Journal observed that “the sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer by law, 
and Clark has certainly played the part.” Even young people feared the local sheriffs 
authority. Black children played a game called "Jim Clark and Negro"— "I'll be Jim 
Clark, you be the Negro. I'll hit you on the head, you fall down."97
Southern racial history suggested that if Selma was a stronghold of nineteenth 
century beliefs, its chief law enforcement officer would be as well. Clark, like his 
constituents, believed that blacks were by nature inferior. He was determined to maintain 
white supremacy, and he did not hide his racial views. Commenting on his confrontation 
with a civil rights worker, Clark noted that "one of the first things I ever learned was not 
to hit a nigger with your fist because his head is too hard." And when a reporter asked 
him if  a particular female defendant was married, the sheriff replied, "She's a nigger 
woman and she hasn't got a Miss or a Mrs. in front of her name."98
Clark's reputation was well known to civil rights leaders, which was largely why 
SNCC and members of the SCLC began their Alabama voter registration drive in Selma.
97 Roy Reed, “Dr. King to Seek New Voting Law,” New York Times, 6 Feb. 1965, p. 1; Will Stevens, 
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98 Alabama Journal, 17 Feb. 1965, p. 2; John Herbers, “Woman Punches Alabama Sheriff,” New York 
Times, 26 Jan. 1965, p. 1.
75
Andrew Young referred to the vestiges of slavery still apparent in the Queen of the Black 
Belt. He noted that though Selma was “a brutal city in the past,” it “suddenly has become 
calm. Actually, this is just a sophisticated source of oppression. They put on a nice, polite 
image but keep you enslaved." Through denial of the ballot, Selma's black population 
remained at the mercy of local government officials like Clark, who was twice elected to 
four-year terms in Dallas County by an electorate that included only 335 out of 15,000 
voting-age blacks."
Civil rights activists thus arrived in Selma hoping to bait the easily-angered 
sheriff into "headline-catching" episodes that would spur the federal government to create 
more effective voting rights laws. They believed that they had a “ready-made situation” 
in Selma, for Clark and his posse would easily and violently respond to local blacks’ 
voter registration attempts.100 Young described Clark as “a prototype of a southern white 
sheriff. . .  he believed that Selma’s black population could be suppressed and controlled 
through force.” Clark’s behavior was “akin” to that of the antebellum sheriffs and slave 
patrols who punished slaves for escaping from their plantations, for Clark and his posse 
punished those who tried to enter the courthouse.101
Ironically, a reciprocal relationship existed between Clark and Selma's black 
community. Like a white community that expected its sheriff to acquiesce or participate
99 John Herbers, “520 More Seized in Alabama Drive,” New York Times, 3 Feb. 1965, p. 1; Gay Talese, 
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in extralegal violence, the black community of Selma similarly expected Clark to respond 
violently to civil rights agitation. But while a white community, in return for their 
sheriffs cooperation, protected him from the law, civil rights activists wanted the 
opposite: attention from the national press that would expose Clark's racist actions and 
bring federal intervention. With the ballot achieved, Selma's blacks would then have 
enough votes to get rid of Jim Clark.
From February 1963 until the spring of 1964, civil rights activists had difficulty 
achieving either of these goals, owing in part to the failure of the South's judiciary system 
to respond to the sheriffs violent methods of law enforcement. Throughout the spring of 
1963, SNCC's monthly Voters' League clinics drew an average of forty people, and by 
mid-June they drew seven hundred to a mass rally. This activity angered Clark, who 
subjected the civil rights workers to a series of harassing arrests. At the end of June, the 
Justice Department filed a request for an ex parte restraining order against Sheriff Clark 
and the other officials involved, but Federal District Judge Daniel Thomas denied the 
request the same day. By early October Clark and his men had arrested over 300 blacks 
attempting to register to vote. When several hundred blacks lined up at the Dallas County 
courthouse on October 7, Sheriff Clark and his deputies harassed the applicants and 
prevented workers from bringing them food and water. A month later, the Justice 
Department again moved for a temporary restraining order to prohibit Sheriff Clark and 
other local officials from interfering with the voting rights of black citizens or attempting 
to intimidate black voter applicants. However, just as district Judge Harold Cox had 
dismissed the second set of indictments against lawmen Price and Rainey in Mississippi, 
ruling that they would only be tried on a misdemeanor count, Judge Thomas ruled in
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favor of the sheriffs department. In a decision entered in March 1964, Thomas decreed 
that no abuse of powers had occurred and denied the request for an injunction against 
Clark and other local officials.
As a teacher for the Dallas County Voters' League said, "The law has become 
very lawless." Although apart from weekly mass meetings, no civil rights activities 
occurred in Selma in the first half of 1964, the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
spurred a reappearance of rights activity in Selma in early July. On July 5, Clark, his 
volunteer mounted posse, and highway patrolmen used tear gas and nightsticks after 
blacks allegedly hurled a volley of rocks and bricks at officers. Blacks denied that they 
threw anything to provoke the attack. On July 6, forty-nine blacks were arrested as they 
paraded on the steps of the courthouse. Noting that he arrested the men for violating city 
laws that prohibited demonstrations while the court was in session, Clark and his men, 
armed with guns, nightsticks, and electric cattle prods, marched the blacks five blocks to 
jail. On the ninth, the trio of Clark, Selma Mayor Chris Heinz, and State Circuit Judge 
James Hare combined to put a damper on civil rights activities in Selma. Responding to a 
complaint by Clark and Heinz, Hare issued an injunction that forbade public gatherings
of more than three people. Like its counterpart in Mississippi, the Dallas County sheriffs
102office enjoyed the support of local government officials for these racist actions. As 
SNCC chairman John Lewis noted, Judge Hare was an extension of Governor Wallace,
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and Jim Clark was an extension of Hare. They represented the “chain of command” that 
civil rights workers faced in Selma.103
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the SCLC used these continued setbacks to highlight 
the ways in which black voting rights were being denied in the Dallas County seat. King 
candidly admitted that the success of the voting rights campaign depended in large part 
on provoking violence. The choice of Selma as the focal point for the SCLC’s 1965 
voting rights effort represented an evolution in the group’s approach to violence. The 
Albany campaign had revealed the limits of nonviolent persuasion, for Police Chief 
Laurie Pritchett had studied King’s philosophy of provocation and strategically 
responded to the demonstrations with his own nonviolence in order to avoid attracting 
national attention to Albany, thus thwarting King’s voting rights goals. Birmingham, 
conversely, had indicated that white violence redounded to the movement's favor. King 
believed that Sheriff Clark, like Birmingham’s aggressive police chief "Bull" Connor, 
would prove an unwitting ally.104
King arrived in early January 1965 and immediately organized the black 
community for marches to the Dallas County courthouse in Selma. By the end of the 
month, Sheriff Clark had arrested nearly two thousand demonstrators and had held his 
temper. Although Clark and his posse occasionally lost control and began to shove and 
kick some of the demonstrators, they avoided the type of excessive violence that would 
attract a national audience. As one participant observed, Clark simply "looked like a
103 John Lewis, Walking With the Wind: A Memoir o f the Movement (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
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caged tiger, stalking about, fuming." Although King had watched Clark drag a woman 
roughly for half a block before shoving her into the patrol car, calling it "one of the most 
brutal and unlawful acts I have seen an officer commit," Clark's violent gestures failed to 
generate the kind of national publicity that could spur the federal government into 
action.105
However, with each passing day, and with each organized civil rights 
demonstration, Clark's hostility increased. On January 22, the Reverend Frederick Reese 
gathered 125 black teachers in Brown Chapel before their planned march to the 
courthouse. He spoke of the importance of the march:
The sheriff will think twice about mistreating you. You are teachers in the public 
school system of the State o f Alabama, but you can't vote. We're going to see 
about that today. If they put us in jail, there won't be anybody to teach the 
children and Clark knows if  they're not in school, then they'll be out in the streets. 
And he doesn't want that.106
His prediction proved at least partially correct. Clark used his nightstick to push and prod 
the marchers back from the door, barking, "You can't make a playhouse out of the 
corridors of this courthouse. Some of you think you can make it a Disneyland." School 
superintendent Joseph Pickard and members of the board of education stood by, urging 
the marchers to return to the church, and asking the sheriff to keep his patience. Clark did 
not entirely lack the usual backup from local officials, however. E.A. Stewart, chairman 
of the Selma schoolboard, warned the teachers that "the sheriff is custodian of this
105 Sheyann Webb and Rachel West Nelson, Selma, Lord, Selma: Girlhood Memories o f the Civil-Rights 
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courthouse and he has been most forbearing." For over fifteen minutes, the teachers 
waited to be arrested, while Clark uttered warnings and made threatening gestures with 
his club. After repeated attempts to enter, and repeated retreats in the face of Clark's billy 
club, the teachers returned to the church. The television cameras of NBC captured it all 
for the nation.107
The next day, Judge Thomas, diverging significantly from his former rulings, 
ordered Clark to stop interfering with black voter applicants and warned that "violence on 
either side will not be tolerated." Clark did not heed Thomas's order. During another long 
wait on the sidewalk outside the courthouse, a "large" black woman named Annie Lee 
Cooper became angry when Clark ordered King to stop talking to reporters and return to 
the long line that had formed by the curb. Cooper sent Sheriff Clark reeling with a 
powerful punch to the head. Three deputies then "grabbed her and wrestled her to the 
ground, and in the flailing, kicking struggle that followed Sheriff Clark clubbed her. She 
was then taken off to jail in two pairs of handcuffs with a wound over her right eye." The 
most important result of this clash was the newspaper coverage that it received. In 
addition to a half-page spread showing two deputies holding Mrs. Cooper's hands while 
Clark bent over her with a nightstick, was Times reporter John Herbers' vivid description 
of the scuffle. "She put up quite a battle as the officers seized her and threw her to the 
ground. 'I wish you would hit me, you scum,' she snapped at the sheriff. He then brought
107 John Herbers, “Negro Teachers Protest in Selma,” New York Times, 23 Jan. 1965, p. 18.
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his billyclub down on her head with a whack that was heard throughout the crowd 
gathered in the street."108
On February 4, perhaps as a result of Selma's continued presence on the nightly 
news, civil rights leaders won a small victory. Judge Thomas ordered a speedup of the 
registration process in Dallas County, insisting that the registration board stop using a 
literacy test set up by the State Supreme Court, process at least one hundred applications 
each day it sat, and refrain from failing applicants on technicalities. Rights leaders 
expressed disappointment, however, not jubilation, for the racist actions of the county’s 
chief law enforcement officer made Judge Thomas’ order virtually meaningless. As King 
observed, "We feel we can have little faith in this, unless something can be done about 
Jim Clark. Until he is removed, the evils of Selma will not be removed." The Reverend 
Andrew Young echoed King's sentiment, noting that "this kind of order without some 
citation of Jim Clark is going to be hard to sell to the people."109
Although the campaign’s success in part required the nation’s recognition of 
blacks’ struggle to vote in Alabama, registration of voters was the ultimate goal. 
Therefore, SCLC considered looking for another town in the Black Belt to rejuvenate its 
efforts, as the drive had so far resulted in the arrest of over three thousand people in 
Dallas County rather than an equal number of registered voters. But Clark came through 
for the civil rights workers in Selma. As a staff member of SCLC said, “Every time it
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appears that the movement is dying out, Sheriff Clark comes to our rescue.” On February 
10, he force-marched 165 teenagers over two miles from the courthouse to the 
countryside. Although some cheerily sang freedom songs, including one of the favorites, 
"I love Jim Clark in my heart," others dropped from exhaustion or followed the posse 
impassively. One rights activist observed their return: "Others were straggling in, and 
some of them vomited. I watched with wide eyes. They had been made to run until they 
were sick." Sheriff Clark's tactics angered the black community. That night, crowds 
packed two black churches, listening to one speaker after another berate Sheriff Clark. 
King reiterated his earlier comment: "Selma will never get right and Dallas County will 
never get right until we get rid of Jim Clark. We are disgusted with brutality, and with 
terroristic methods, and with Jim Clark's downright meanness in the handling of the boys 
and girls in our community."110
The climax of the Selma campaign occurred on March 7, a date that journalists 
would immortalize as Bloody Sunday. During the last week of February, a state trooper 
in nearby Marion seriously wounded Jimmie Lee Jackson, a black teenager. He died eight 
days later. Although the incident failed to generate much national publicity, SCLC and 
the NAACP pledged that Jackson’s death would encourage their continued pressure upon 
Congress to adopt a new voting law providing for federal registrars in areas like Selma. 
As Roy Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP, wrote in a telegram to Jackson’s 
mother, “We can no longer leave to ..  . sheriffs such as Jim Clark determination of 
registration procedures and the continued denial of franchise.” Despite Governor George
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Wallace's order against a march, SCLC planned a fifty-mile walk from Selma to the state 
capitol in Montgomery to protest Jackson's death and Selma's continued use of violence 
to block voter registration. In the early afternoon of March 7, Hosea Williams addressed 
the hundreds of marchers gathered inside Brown's Chapel, impressing upon them the 
importance of provoking violence while not participating in it. "We must pray that we are 
attacked, for if  the sheriff does nothing to stop us, if the state troopers help us accomplish 
our long walk, if the governor meets us on the steps of the Capitol. . .  then we have lost. 
We must pray . . .  for the white man to commit violence, and we must not fight back!"111
SCLC's Williams and SNCC's John Lewis led the six hundred marchers in a long, 
double-file column from Brown's Chapel toward the Edmund Pettus Bridge. They walked 
on Selma's streets without interference, but when they reached the crest of the bridge, as 
one participant recalled, the line of about fifty helmeted Alabama state troopers spanning 
the width of the bridge "looked like a blue picket fence." Behind the troopers were 
several dozen more of Clark's posse, about fifteen of them on horseback. A hundred or so 
white spectators looked on from the sides o f the highway. When the column of marchers 
refused to move after Major John Cloud’s order for dispersal, the troopers advanced. As 
the Times reported, the "flying wedge" of troopers "swept ten or twenty blacks to the 
ground screaming, arms and legs flying." White spectators cheered the officials' efforts, 
mounted posse members galloped into the retreating mass flailing their nightsticks, and
111 NAACP Papers, Part 24, 17:659; David R. Goldfield, Black, White, and Southern: Race Relations 
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troopers released tear gas. The lawmen, both on foot and on horseback, chased the blacks 
back into the black neighborhood and housing project adjacent to Brown's Chapel.112
That night, about six hundred blacks met again in Brown's Chapel. Williams told
the group that he had fought in World War II and had been captured by the Germans, but
he added "that the Germans never were as inhuman as the state troopers of Alabama."
However, SCLC leaders still planned to attempt the trek to Montgomery once more on
March 9. As one participant recalled:
When I first went into that church that evening those people sitting there were 
beaten, I mean their spirit, their will was beaten. But when that singing started, we 
grew stronger. Each one of us said to ourselves that we could go back out there 
and face the tear gas, face the horses, face whatever Jim Clark could throw at 
us.113
Bloody Sunday garnered the public attention and created the public reaction that 
civil rights leaders had sought. The nation not only saw photographs of the violence 
inflicted upon peaceful marchers, but read with shock of southern lawmakers, journalists, 
and the general public's defense of their region and its method of law enforcement. 
Alongside pictures of injured marchers, gas-masked state troopers, and club and whip- 
wielding posse members were words of support from both local and state government 
officials who defended the troopers' actions and denied that Alabama was blameworthy 
or unique in its handling of racially-charged situations. Claiming that Selma was a city 
"operating within the law," Selma's Mayor Joe Smitherman noted that when outside
112 Webb and Nelson, 93; New York Times, 8 March 1965, p. 1.
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agitators came in saying "they're the law," a loss of democracy occurred.114 Following the 
events of March 7, he told the press that he wanted President Johnson to urge the 
"outsiders" to leave Selma. Smitherman later recalled, "This whole civil rights thing was 
like a war, like we were being invaded." Just as Alabamians and other southerners had 
felt under siege during the North's occupation of the post-Civil War South, their mid­
twentieth century counterparts similarly felt as though northern "invaders" were again 
attempting to refashion the South's social, political, and economic order. Andrew Young 
noticed this inability of Selma’s citizens’ to separate the antebellum past from the 
twentieth century present, commenting that the Union Army’s 1865 destruction of Selma 
was “frequently mentioned when we [SCLC and SNCC] were there, as if we were the 
second coming of the Union Army.”115
Even further up the government totem pole, Governor Wallace denied that 
Alabama state troopers and sheriffs deputies used unnecessary force in routing the 
marchers and warned that if  the rights activists attempted another march on Tuesday, 
there would be no change in police tactics. Continuing his defense of the troopers' 
actions, he argued that it was probable that the police's billy club and tear gas assault 
actually saved the lives of some of the marchers by turning them away from the angry 
white spectators and back toward Selma. Just as Mississippi Governor Paul Johnson 
argued when the three rights workers disappeared in Philadelphia, Wallace invoked a 
comparison with the North. Calling the national press's reporting of the Sunday march
114 Birmingham News, 8 March 1965, p. 10; Quoted in Webb and Nelson, 43.
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"distorted," Wallace countered that "not nearly as many were hurt as were hurt in similar 
occurrences in other states, including those in the North."116
Watching Selma's racial activity from Washington, two of Alabama's 
congressional representatives praised Governor Wallace and state law enforcement 
officers for the "admirable manner" and "efficiency" in which they handled the "trying 
situation foisted upon Alabama by the un-American actions of this mob." Furthermore, 
they congratulated those black citizens who "recognized these outside agitators for what 
they are and remained loyal to their home state and its institutions." As the NAACP’s 
Roy Wilkins appropriately remarked in response to statements such as these, it was 
useless to appeal to Alabama authorities when those same "state people" had allowed
i t  n
Selma blacks to be "ridden over and beaten and their women dragged around."
Not surprisingly, public opinion, as expressed in newspaper editorials across 
Alabama, agreed with the viewpoint of many of the state's government officials. Many 
Selma citizens, in the words of one resident, hoped that "Dr. King will leave town and let 
us deal with the problem in our own way." They knew that one way to ensure King's 
departure was to respond peacefully to the rights' marches, thereby keeping television 
cameras and journalists from recording acts of racist brutality that would prompt the 
federal government's "invasion" of their state. One editorial bemoaned the fact that 
Bloody Sunday gave "the ruthless King everything he could possibly have wanted and a 
thousand times more than he expected." Therefore, while Selma’s white citizens
116 Ben Franklin, “Wallace Says Police Saved Negro Lives,” New York Times, 9 March 1965, p. 1.
117 Jack Wallace, “Joint Resolution Praising Wallace Fails in Senate,” Birmingham News, 10 March 
1965, p. 2.
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"abhorred" the civil rights movement and feared legislation that would infringe upon their 
voter registration system, they expressed concern over Alabama’s reputation, and asked 
Governor Wallace to "take steps to cool things off." In addition, local editorials ui:ged 
Clark to adopt the "courage of restraint," and avoid the "hasty swinging of clubs and 
lashes" that would make new rights legislation a "dead certainty." Although they granted 
that Clark was in a "most difficult spot" and that he and his deputies had "no choice other 
than to try to enforce the laws on our books," they suggested that he avoid "excessive 
force." Again, they blamed the rights activists for provoking such violence, chastising 
them for defying Wallace's order and for assuming that deprivation of civil rights allowed 
them "unlimited privilege to disturb the peace."118
Clark, as he had since the rights activists' arrival in Selma, remained committed to 
thwarting voter registration attempts and refused to accept that his arrests of and brutality 
toward rights workers accounted for their continued presence in Selma. He noted that he 
had to move his family into the quarters at the county jail owing to telephone threats, but 
he simultaneously insisted that the races coexisted harmoniously in Alabama. 
Furthermore, although he ignored Ku Klux Klan activity, his own violent methods of law 
enforcement, and the fact that at one time Selma had the largest Citizens Council in 
Alabama, he mimicked many of his constituents and other local and state officials in 
blaming "outsiders" for the assaults upon and arrests of civil rights activists. In other 
words, civil rights leaders, whom Clark called "morally depraved, personally degenerate,
118 Herbers, “Black Belt,” New York Times, 14 Feb. 1965; Alabama Journal, 9 March 1965, p. 4; Selma 
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and intellectually dishonest," provoked violence, and caused "the situation to become 
very tense."119
Clark viewed Martin Luther King as the main source of Selma's racial troubles, 
arguing that King did more to "destroy the relations between the white man and Negro in 
Selma and Dallas County than any other one thing that has happened in the last 100 
years." He was an "outside agitator" who "came in to stir up trouble" and to "grab for 
power" because he had a “personal vendetta” against Clark. In a joint statement printed in 
the Selma Times-Journal, Clark and Mayor Smitherman wrote that the "outside agitators 
are interested in Selma only as a focal point for propaganda . .  . and they neither want nor 
will accept a solution to our present crisis." In addition, the two local officials urged that 
the "entire community must stand firm ly. . .  and not yield to or compromise with 
unlawful pressure or unruly demonstrations." The national press was also blameworthy, 
as Clark argued that they embellished stories with "sensationalism and unadulterated 
fiction," presenting "colorful and imaginative" accounts of activities in Selma that were 
creative, not objective.120
Outside of Alabama, however, newspapers and various individuals and 
organizations placed blame on Clark and other state and local officials, expressing shock 
and indignation at Selma's methods of law enforcement. The New York Times, for 
example, editorialized that Governor Wallace, "by authorizing state troopers, sheriffs
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deputies and members of a volunteer posse to attack a group of private citizens, has 
written another shameful page in his own record and in the history of Alabama." Quoting 
the reporters' vivid descriptions of the events o f March 7, the editors noted that "if this is 
described as law enforcement, it is misnamed. It is nothing more nor less than race­
conscious officialdom run amuck." The Chicago Tribune called the actions of the 
"Alabama gestapo" a "national disgrace," and the Washington Post found it "simply 
inconceivable that in this day and age, the police who have sworn to uphold the law and 
protect the citizenry could resort, instead, to violent attacks upon them."121
As forty-three members of the House and seven members of the Senate offered 
harsh condemnations of the tactics and weapons used by the Alabama lawmen and called 
for voting rights legislation, civic and religious organizations like the Anti-Defamation 
League and the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice also reacted publicly 
to news of the attack. Invoking the now familiar reference to Nazi Germany, the latter 
organization said that the behavior of the Alabama state troopers "recalls the days of the 
Nazi Storm Troopers," and the Anti-Defamation League called "the shocking spectacle of 
helmeted and gas-masked troopers attacking defenseless Negro American citizens 
gathered for a peaceable demonstration . . .  a blot on our country's record." In addition, 
several governors, obviously holding dramatically different racial views than their 
southern counterpart, criticized the mishandling of Sunday's march. Some wrote Wallace, 
disputing his "improper" and "shameful" method of handling the demonstration, while
121 Franklin, “Wallace Says Police,” New York Times, 9 March 1965, p. 34; Tribune and Post quoted in 
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others participated in marches protesting Selma's Sunday events or asked their state
* ♦ • 122 senators to pass a congressional resolution condemning the police brutality in Selma.
"Bloody Sunday" caught the attention of President Johnson as well. Ten days 
after the event, Johnson addressed Congress and the nation via radio and television. He 
had been preparing to send a voting rights bill to Congress, but as a result of Selma's 
violent Sunday march, Johnson felt increased pressure to prevent further discrimination 
against the potential black voter. Comparing Selma to Concord, Lexington, and 
Appomattox, significant "turning points in man’s unending search for freedom," he noted 
that there would be no "delay, hesitation, or compromise" in eliminating illegal 
restrictions used to deny blacks' right to vote. He asked Congress to join him in "working 
long hours, nights, and weekends to pass this bill," for "outside this chamber is the 
outraged conscience of a nation, the grave concern of many nations, and the harsh 
judgment of history on our acts." As the Selma Times-Journal observed, discrimination 
might have continued if  Governor Wallace had not told his state troopers to use any 
"necessary force" to stop the march, but that force unleashed such a "storm of protest" 
that "voting in the South will probably never be the same again and the cause of civil 
rights and desegregation has been pushed ahead by years."
Bloody Sunday led directly to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. On August 
6, 1965, Johnson fulfilled his promise and signed the act into law, effectively opening up 
the polls to blacks throughout the South for the first time since the disfranchisement of
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the late nineteenth century. In addition to suspending literacy tests and other restrictive 
subterfuges, the act provided for federal registrars and poll watchers in those "hard-core” 
counties where the Census determined that “less than 50 percentum of the persons of 
voting age residing therein were registered.”124 The 1965 Voting Rights Act did not mark 
the end of the civil rights movement, but the beginning of a "maturation process" for
1 a  r
southern blacks. Leadership and participation in the movement had left them well 
armed to continue the pressure against the vestiges of white supremacy.
This was nowhere truer than in Dallas County, Alabama. A year after Bloody 
Sunday, almost eleven thousand blacks were registered to vote. With the power of the 
ballot now in hand, Selma's black community was determined to oust Sheriff Jim Clark 
from office. In the spring of 1966, Wilson Baker, Selma's former public safety director, 
ran against Clark for the office of sheriff. Not surprisingly, Clark remained determined to 
fight the black vote until the bitter end. The race had prompted a heavy turnout of black 
voters who relished the opportunity to vote against Clark. A close tally resulted, and 
Clark attempted to have the ballots cast in six largely black precincts thrown out on the 
grounds that irregularities had occurred at those polling places. As had happened 
throughout the civil rights activity in Selma, local government supported the sheriff. The 
county Democratic Executive Committee, which was chaired by a founder of the White 
Citizens’ Council, voted to accept Clark's claims and to disqualify the challenged black 
ballots. However, the Justice Department protected black interests, and in a federal
124 Voting Rights A c t, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 1973b (1965).
125 Goldfield, 168-9.
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hearing, Judge Thomas concluded that Clark's and the committee's claims of irregularities 
concerning the six black boxes lacked any validity. The votes were included in the final
196tally, black voters thus providing Baker’s margin of victory over Clark.
Two years later Jim Clark's political career ended when he drew only 18 percent 
of the vote in a statewide race for the chairmanship of the Alabama Public Service 
Commission. At the beginning of the voting rights drive in Selma, one civil rights activist 
commented that registering to vote was not the immediate issue for blacks; the problem 
was just gaining entrance to Clark’s “personal domain”—the Dallas County courthouse 
where all voters were registered.127 By achieving the black vote, rights activists not only 
solved this problem, but gave blacks an opportunity to vote against racist sheriffs like Jim 
Clark.
As Selma civil rights activist J.L. Chestnut observed in his memoir, Clark’s
“swagger” disappeared with his political career. No longer equipped with the physical
accoutrements of the sheriffs office that provided a material display of his power and
status, Clark’s presence in Selma inspired nothing but indifference:
I was standing outside Sam Washington’s tailor shop . . .  when Clark drove by, 
very slowly, looking from side to side . . . He was driving an ordinary car and 
wearing civilian clothes, somewhat unkempt. Black people, as usual, were lined 
up like flies, drinking whiskey, keeping up noise, and having fun. There’d been a 
time when Clark’s presence would have cleared the sidewalk . .  . That morning 
they just stood looking as he drove slowly down the street. . .  He obviously 
wanted us to see him. He seemed to want some reaction, but all he got was “Hell, 
there goes Clark.” As he looked over at us, I thought I saw in his face a sad
126 Roy Reed, “Bloody Sunday Was Year Ago; Now Selma Negroes Are Hopeful,” New York Times, 6 
March 1966, p. 76; New York Times, 5 May 1966, p. 30; 6 May 1966, p. 1; 7 May 1966, p. 1.
127 Goldfield, 304, n44; Webb and Nelson, 33; “personal domain”: Lewis, 306.
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recognition that he was no longer in charge. Black people had not gone anywhere.
We were still here, and we didn’t give a damn about him anymore.
According to Chestnut, Selma’s white community ignored Clark as well, making him the 
“scapegoat” for the city’s racial troubles.129 Perhaps the race for the chairmanship of the 
Public Service Commission affords the best illustration of Clark’s ostracized status, even 
beyond the borders of Selma. Ironically, the political voices of black and white 
communities across Alabama united in Clark’s final campaign for public office, for both 
races used the ballot to remind Clark of his failure to subvert the voting rights drive. If, as 
John Lewis noted, Clark “ran the county like a king” during his tenure as sheriff, 
Chestnut’s observation reveals that the Voting Rights Act effectively exiled Clark from 
his kingdom.130
128 J.L. Chestnut and Julia Cass, Black in Selma: The Uncommon Life ofJ.L. Chestnut, Jr. (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990), 241-2.
129 Chestnut and Cass, 242.
130 Lewis, 306.
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PART IV 
THE COLOR OF THE LAW
From Ida B. Wells’s observation in 1892 that southern sheriffs typically submitted 
to mob rule to the Southern Regional Council’s description of them in 1964 as “sadism 
hiding behind a badge,” the central—and constant— role of sheriffs in southern racial 
violence becomes abundantly clear.131 Through studying sheriffs like Jeremiah Shipp, 
Lawrence Rainey, and Jim Clark, we hear the voices of members of the white community 
who applauded the racist views of their chief law enforcement officer, the voices of local 
government officials who either ignored or condoned the actions of a racist sheriff, and 
finally, the voices of the nation, as they expressed shock at the South’s perverted 
definition of justice. Once the black community regained the ballot in 1965, their voices, 
spoken through the ballot, illustrated the southern sheriff’s sudden impotence, as sheriffs 
like Jim Clark found themselves voted out o f office by the very race they had once 
overpowered. Thus, to study the southern sheriff reveals not only the white community’s 
racial attitudes, but also the strides made possible by the Voting Rights Act.
In 1967, two years after the passage of the Act, Walter Calhoun, a black man, ran 
for sheriff of Wilcox County, Alabama. His candidacy effectively illustrates that the 
terror and violence endured by voting rights activists in communities like Selma and 
Philadelphia actually yielded a positive result. The seemingly inseparable relationship
131 Southern Regional Council, “Law Enforcement in Mississippi.” Atlanta, 1964.
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between the southern sheriff and racial injustice was coming to an end. Unlike other civil 
rights acts that only slowly changed southern life, the Voting Rights Act had an 
immediate impact. However, though Wilcox was able to run for sheriff, the white citizens 
of Wilcox reacted with shock to the news of Calhoun's candidacy. This was a county that 
had refused to sign a school desegregation plan as required by the federal government, 
insisting that black and white children should not sit as equals in the classroom. A black 
man running for sheriff was even worse than desegregated schools, for if elected,
Calhoun would not only be an equal, but a superior, with the power to question, arrest, 
and even imprison whites. Furthermore, the white population's consternation was only 
increased by the knowledge that local blacks had the ability to elect Calhoun, when only
• * 1  ^ 9ten months earlier, not a single black was registered to vote in the county.
Until Calhoun filed for candidacy, the black community did not think much 
would come of the new Voting Rights Act. After all, Congress had passed a law in 1964 
saying that restaurants and hotels must be desegregated, but no black person in the county 
had set foot inside these white establishments, except to cook or clean. Calhoun lost the 
election to incumbent "Lum" Jenkins, who had served as sheriff of Wilcox County for 
twenty-seven years. However, in Macon County, Alabama, a center of black intellectual 
life and home of the Tuskegee Institute, Lucius Amerson ran for sheriff and won. While 
undoubtedly helped by the fact that Macon County’s population in the 1960s was 84 
percent black, Amerson’s victory earned him the distinction of becoming the first black 
man to hold the southern sheriffs office since Reconstruction. The Voting Rights Act 
gave black men like Calhoun and Amerson the opportunity to run and black citizens the
132 New York Times Magazine 27 Nov. 1967, p. A-2.
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opportunity to visit the ballot box. As Jack Rosenthal, Special Assistant to the Attorney 
General, wrote in 1966 to Clifford Alexander, Special Counsel to President Lyndon 
Johnson, the vote was proving to be a powerful instrument of reform against “Jim Crow 
justice.”133
Indeed, the bill dismantled the legal restraints that prevented black southerners 
from voting, and allowed them to influence the choice of sheriff. Since Calhoun’s 
candidacy, the demographics of the southern sheriff s office have changed dramatically, 
and newspaper headlines have acknowledged the South’s “new” brand of sheriffs. In 
1992, the nation’s first black female sheriff, Jackie Barrett, was elected sheriff o f Fulton 
County, Georgia. Before the election, headlines such as “Black Woman Set to Break the 
Redneck-Sheriff Ceiling” and “Black Woman Candidate Tries to Debunk Image of 
Southern Sheriff’ addressed her “far from stereotype” appearance. Increasingly, women 
have entered the office; nine of the nation's twenty-four female sheriffs are in the South. 
Snapshots of four sheriffs' departments — in Fulton and Monroe Counties, Georgia; in 
Davidson County, Tennessee, and in Duval County, Florida --illustrate how much this 
most southern of political offices has changed in the last forty years. In 1960, only two of 
the sheriffs in those counties had college degrees, and all four were white men. Today all 
four sheriffs have undergraduate and master’s degrees. Davidson and Fulton counties 
have female sheriffs, one of them black. Duval County has an African-American man as 
sheriff.134
133 Michael Belknap, Civil Rights, the White House, and the Justice Department, 1945-1968: Racial 
Violence and Law Enforcement in the South (New York: Garland, 1991), 500.
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Headlines also acknowledge other significant improvements within the southern 
sheriffs office. In 1999, John William King went on trial in Jasper, Texas, for dragging a 
black man, James Byrd, Jr., to death behind a pickup truck. Under the headline “Deputies 
Can Change,” a reporter for the San Antonio Express-News happily observed that two 
Jasper County sheriffs deputies embraced after hearing that King was sentenced to 
death. This was certainly a sign of change, the reporter noted, for “it wasn’t too long ago 
that [southern] law enforcement officials not only did not celebrate the punishment of
t  -1C
racial violence, but actively took part in the violence.”
But as this reporter clarified, King’s conviction did not signal an end to racism in 
America. Just as one conviction cannot eradicate four hundred years of racism and deeply 
ingrained prejudice, neither can the Voting Rights Act alone eradicate racism within the 
southern sheriffs office. In 1998, Earl Britt, sheriff of Tensas Parish County, Louisiana, 
faced trial for allegedly beating two inmates and lying about it to federal investigators. 
Additional witness testimony accused Britt o f observing a deputy strike an inmate and 
instructing an employee to “take care of business,” but the presiding U.S. district judge 
ruled that these alleged incidents were inadmissible because they did not involve an 
assault by Britt himself. Britt was indicted on two counts of violating the civil rights of 
black prisoners and ultimately pleaded guilty to both counts. He received a fine and 
probation.136
134 USA Today, 16 Dec. 1999, p. A-l.
135 Rick Casey, San Antonio Express-News, 28 Feb. 1999, p. A-2.
136 Associated Press Newswires, 23 Sept. 1998, 17 May 1999.
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The National Sheriffs' Association has asked television and movie producers to 
stop depicting the southern sheriff as "a fat, tobacco-chewing clown," for this image 
implies ignorance and incompetence. The Sheriffs’ Association is undoubtedly aware, 
too, that this image implies racism, for during the Civil Rights Movement, overweight, 
tobacco-chewing southern sheriffs repeatedly made national news when they violently 
thwarted the efforts of civil rights activists. Although Rainey and Clark provide only two 
examples of southern sheriffs, and egregious ones at that, their racist actions shocked a 
nation reading and watching from afar.
Alongside details of Rainey’s involvement in the murder of the three rights 
workers, or Clark’s treatment of local blacks attempting voter registration, were extensive 
physical descriptions of these southern sheriffs. Reporters often introduced the sheriffs 
into news stories by noting their weight and their attire, most notably the various 
weapons that girded their waistlines. These descriptions helped readers realize that these 
armed and “bear-shaped” sheriffs could easily prevent a voter registration line from 
moving forward and could easily intimidate the local black population. In fact, Clark and 
his posse seemed to be the only obstacle to a voter registration card, and Rainey the 
linchpin behind Klan activity in Philadelphia, Mississippi. Photographs gave the words 
an unforgettable image, for Rainey, pictured with a tobacco-stuffed cheek, grinning 
broadly during his arraignment, and Clark, pictured holding a club in his massive arm and 
preparing to strike a black woman lying on the ground, looked undaunted and invincible. 
Their physical appearances thus became synonymous with their violent actions—burly 
physiques and belt lines bulging with weapons were identifiable evidence of racism and 
cruelty.
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The National Sheriffs’ Association might have to wait some time for the image of 
the southern sheriff as a “fat, tobacco-chewing clown” to disappear completely. As one 
journalist who covered the Tensas Parish case wrote, the stereotype of the racist southern 
sheriff persists because it “occurs just often enough to remain believable.”137 The success 
of the Voting Rights Act illustrated that one law can have an immediate impact and bring 
significant change. But one racist southern sheriff can quickly re-ignite a stereotype to 
remind that one law alone cannot change the color of the law.
137 Saturday State Times/Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, LA), 28 Feb. 1998, p. B-6.
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